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1Chapter 1: Induction and Deduction in Natural Kinds 
A central concern of cognitive development research is the nature and 
organization of knowledge.  Early philosophers such as John Locke and David Hume 
proposed an associative theory of knowledge suggesting that infants had only 
minimal skills at birth.  Using these minimal skills they developed their knowledge by 
associating contiguous experiences in their environment thereby slowly expanding 
their knowledge base. This suggests that children are blank slates at birth (Locke, 
1959/1671; Pinker, 2002).  
By the 1920’s and continuing through the 1970’s, Jean Piaget proposed an 
alternative to the associative or empiricist theory. He proposed that children have 
more than just associative skills.  Instead, they are born with motor and perceptual 
capabilities that allow them to explore their world in order to construct concepts and 
understandings.  Piaget’s constructivist perspective included several new major ideas 
that are of importance. First, that development is achieved in stages. These stages 
must progress in a particular order and each stage represents major qualitative shifts 
for the child in multiple domains. Thus, when children do move from one stage to 
another, this move affects many concepts at the same time (Flavell, 1971). Also, 
according to this theoretical perspective it is not possible to attain abstract learning 
capabilities and concepts before concrete concepts and reasoning skills have been 
mastered. Piaget argues that true conceptual development emerges slowly and is 
found only in older children and adults (Flavell, 1963). 
By the mid - 1970’s Piaget began to fall from favor and other groups of 
researchers  proposed a new model of knowledge acquisition arising from the field of 
2artificial intelligence (AI); the  information processing model (IP). This model 
suggests that the way in which knowledge is stored and retrieved forms the basis for 
how knowledge is gained (Klahr & MacWhinney, 1998). IP theorists suggest that 
children pay attention to the environment, store information in long and short term 
memory and then apply strategies to retrieve and expand their knowledge. As they 
mature and gain more experience they increase their strategic skills allowing them to 
overcome processing limitations such as memory constraints. In this model the 
child’s thinking is synonymous with processing information and building knowledge.  
Development is not stage-like, but instead depends on a metacognitive approach 
where children continuously adjust their strategies to overcome limitations by using 
their specific content knowledge and experiences. This requires a precise analysis of 
change and the incorporation of new contributions of ongoing cognitive activity. 
Stage development is no longer valid with IP because the child is in a constant state 
of change through self-modification and because reasoning proficiency is content 
specific (Siegler & Alibali, 2005).   
At the opposite end of the spectrum from the empiricism described by Locke 
and Hume is the notion of nativism.  As described in the 1700’s by philosopher 
Immanuel Kant and more recently by linguist Noam Chomsky (Chomsky, 1972), 
nativism argues that important concepts are present at birth. Instead of being 
developed through experience they merely unfold with maturation much the way that 
physical development or puberty unfolds for an individual child. This model assumes 
that knowledge is in place, it is simply a matter of unlocking it. An important proving 
ground for neo-nativists is the development of reasoning about natural kinds. 
3With respect to natural kinds, some prominent researchers have taken a neo-
nativist stance and claimed that young children use an intuitive theory to help them 
understand particular foundational domains, such as the nature of mental life, 
biological categories, and intuitive physics (Gelman, 2003; Gelman & Wellman, 
1991; Haslam, Bastian, & Bissett, 2004; Heyman, Phillips, & Gelman, 2003).  For 
example, researchers claim (Gelman, 1988, 2000, 2003; Gelman & Coley, 1990; 
Gelman & Markman, 1987; Gelman & Medin, 1993; Keil, 1989; Medin & Ortony, 
1989) that young children’s biological concepts are embedded in a causal theory 
about the nature of living organisms, a subset of the natural kinds.  Two key features 
of this theory are the concept of biological essences and the use of inductive 
generalizations.  The theory implies that inductive generalizations are used by the 
child to organize and extend knowledge about the biological world. 
This new study tests the claim that young children are intuitive theoreticians 
by examining whether a causal theory supports both inductive and deductive 
reasoning in the domain of biological concepts.  It also explores the potential 
influence of frame and linguistic factors as they influence access and use of the 
theory. 
This chapter is organized into four parts beginning with a general definition of 
the term natural kinds and an overview of inductive and deductive reasoning. The 
second section is a description of three theories of categorization including classical 
categorization, semantic theory, and concepts as theory.  Basic, subordinate, and 
superordinate category level definitions as well as property inheritance are presented 
in the third section. The fourth section describes some of the research in biological 
4understanding that supports the “concepts as theory” theory and includes discussions 
of category levels, labels, argument strength and folkbiology.   
Natural Kind and Deductive/Inductive Reasoning 
Both inductions and deductions are made across category members; however, 
the type of category (e.g., natural kinds) will make one kind of inference easier or 
harder than another.  Current research on concepts has focused on natural kinds in 
relation to both inductive and deductive reasoning.  
Natural Kinds 
Natural kind is a descriptive for a category of naturally occurring instances of 
living organisms with insides that can be examined to gain information about their 
functioning. The information gleaned from this examination is assumed to show three 
specific consistencies.  First, natural kinds have properties consistent across the class 
or kind.  Whatever characteristics make a person part of the class called humans will 
also be found in other instances of the natural kind called humans.  Next, natural 
kinds are consistent across generations.  Whatever traits and characteristics make a 
person a human will be the same traits and characteristics that make her progeny 
human.  Finally, whatever characteristics make a person human today are the same 
characteristics that will make a person human tomorrow.   
These three consistencies are important because they allow a reliable 
categorization of instances of natural kinds and give rise to the use of both deductive 
and inductive reasoning.  For example, the dissection of a frog reveals information 
that helps us understand how the frog continues to be what it is.  Under a microscope, 
even more detailed information may be revealed.  We also know that the insides of 
5these naturally occurring instances of a kind will be exhibited in the next generation 
in basically the same way.  The dissection of a table or chair would not reveal much 
in the way of information about how the chair continued to be what it was, nor would 
we assume that anything that we did find could be applied in any reasonable way to a 
description of the next chair that we dissected.  
People intuitively assume that natural kinds contain some hidden essence that 
defines what the kind is, that is, what makes a turtle a turtle or a lion a lion.  This 
essence is shared with other categorical members and permits generalizations from 
one member of the kind to the next. Thus, natural kinds are categories that permit 
inductions.  The essence is comprised of characteristics or traits that are not 
outwardly obvious, but that serve as criteria for class inclusion because they represent 
the true nature of an item and give it a conceptual identity.  Appreciation of this 
essence is considered to be intuitive knowledge; therefore everyone does not 
necessarily describe it in the same terms.  
Whereas a child might identify an animal as a lion and claim that the 
identification is true because of the way the animal acts, an adult may claim that the 
animal’s DNA is the essence of the animal and what makes it a lion.  In both cases, 
although the level of descriptive sophistication is markedly different, the essence 
remains an intangible quality, which is considered a permanent element of the natural 
kind’s being and something that helps define its place in a taxonomy of natural 
things. 
6The category of natural kinds lends itself to the use of both inductive and 
deductive reasoning.  Induction is used to extend information about common 
properties to new instances and deduction is used to validate generalizations.  
Deductive Reasoning 
We all use logic as a problem solving strategy to help us understand the world 
around us.  In the most basic terms, we are using the truth of one statement to infer 
the truth of other statements.   
Deductive reasoning is the type of logic formula that we apply to analyze 
information where a reliable conclusion can be stated.  A deductive scheme or 
syllogism represents a formal argument consisting of a major and minor premise and 
a conclusion.  For example, suppose we know “If it’s a blue jay (represented by the 
letter P), it has vitamin K inside (represented by the letter Q).”  This is stated as “if P, 
then Q.” It is possible to use this truth to deductively infer other conclusions.  For 
example, if I tell you, “I have a blue jay in my hand” and then I ask you, “Does it 
have vitamin K inside?”, you could say yes and be certain that you were correct 
(Modus Ponens).  If I tell you, “This is not a blue jay in my hand,” and then I ask you, 
“Does it have vitamin K inside?” the only accurate response would be that there is no 
way to tell (Deny the Antecedent).  I could also tell you “I have something in my 
hand that has vitamin K inside,” and then ask you “Is it a blue jay?”  In this case, the 
accurate response would be that there was no way to tell (Affirm the Consequence).  
And, finally, I could tell you “What I have in my hand does not contain vitamin K,” 
and then ask you “Is it a blue jay?”  You could be certain that your answer of no was 
correct (Modus Tollens).   
7Only Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens represent true deductive reasoning 
because they are the only instances in which an indisputable truth is possible.  Written 
as an equation, with the letters above the line representing the premise and the letter 
below the line representing the conclusion, all four syllogisms are shown as equations 
in Figure 1. 
 
Modus 
Ponens 
Modus 
Tollens 
Deny the 
Antecedent 
Accept the 
Consequence 
P  Q P  Q P  Q P  Q
P ~ Q ~ P Q
Q ~ P No way to tell No way to tell 
Figure 1. Graphic representation of four deductive syllogisms. 
 
These abstract formulae assume that once one makes accurate inferences (e.g., 
Modus Tollens) one can do so for any P or Q, but it turns out that deduction is highly 
influenced by context. For example, deductions with permissions are easier than with 
causal statements (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985).  One might assume that deductions 
embedded in a highly organized theory-based domain would be easier because of the 
conceptual and semantic framework provided.  Therefore, it is of interest to examine 
deductions in the domain of natural kinds. 
Although Piaget claimed that deduction skills don’t require context, the 
literature has shown otherwise for both children and adults (Johnson-Laird, 1995; 
Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972; Wason, 1995). 
8Inductive Reasoning 
While deduction is used to draw an indisputable truth by reasoning, for 
example, from general to specific, induction is a probabilistic route to the truth 
because it can never claim absolute certainty. Induction uses the ability to recognize 
patterns, form conjectures based on these patterns, and reason from specific to 
specific or from specific to general.  It takes a generally known fact or pattern and 
concludes that this fact can be assumed to be correct in other similar situations.   
For example, if we know that the heart is a muscle that pumps blood through 
the body to keep it alive, and we also know that our dog has a heart, then it is 
reasonable to assume that other living dogs in the neighborhood also have hearts.  By 
extending this assumption to the neighborhood cats, squirrels, chipmunks and rabbits, 
we are applying inductive reasoning to make a conclusion about the biological insides 
of the mammals in our sphere of knowledge.  Inductive reasoning allows us to make 
reasonable conclusions about natural kinds that may be unfamiliar because of the rich 
generalizability of anatomical properties across biological categories. By using 
inductive reasoning we take specific pieces of information and use them to make 
general assumptions that will never yield absolute certainty. What permits these 
inductions is a coherent theory of a content domain such as natural kinds.   
Categorization Theories 
The type of category (e.g., natural kinds) is only one factor that influences 
inference.  The categorization model applied by the organizer also makes one type of 
inference easier or more difficult than another does.   
9Categorization is a mechanism that we use for sorting, storing, eliminating, 
retrieving, and extending information.  Categories, such as natural kinds, allow us to 
organize diverse information into hierarchical cohesive groups that share similar 
characteristics by using specified criteria to define the relationship between instances 
as they exist in space and time. Three theories of how categories are utilized to 
organize information are described in the literature (Keil, 1989; Murphy, 2002; 
Rosch, 1975; Scholnick, 1999).  They are classical categorization, semantic 
categorization, and concepts as theory.  Key differences exist among these category 
theories.  First, they differ in how the reasoner conceives the rules for categorization 
and applies them to members of the category. Second, they differ in the types of 
reasoning that can be used to determine category membership.  Third, they differ in 
the types of within category levels that are applied (e.g., basic, subordinate, 
superordinate).  Finally, they differ in the type of concepts that anchor the theory. 
Classical Categorization 
The classical categorization defined by Aristotle is a conceptual system based 
on the use of ontological categories, the most basic of which are physical objects and 
events (Carey, 1985).  It is a categorization methodology that is defined by its use of a 
syntactic rule (Scholnick, 1999) “all and only.”  Members of a category all have the 
specific criteria defined by a set of rules.  In addition, only members of that category 
meet the specified membership criteria.   
For example, in the category of mammals, all members of the category 
defined as mammal must meet specific physical criteria.  They nurse their young, 
have hair, and are warm-blooded.  To be a member of the category all members must 
10 
 
meet all of these physical criteria.  These rules, in this case physical attributes, are 
considered pieces of information or predicates that describe a characteristic that can 
be attributed to category members.  For example, “has hair” is a predicate that 
describes a necessary characteristic for category membership. In addition, only 
members of this category have this constellation of physical attributes.   
By applying the logic of “all and only” you are either in the category or not, 
but never in-between.  Borders are crisp within this category schema. One of the 
hallmarks of classical categorization is the clear-cut categorization produced by the 
category inclusion rules.  With the use of the “all and only” rule structure, something 
either is or is not a member of the category and the person structuring the category 
either does or does not know the rules of the category and the necessary information 
about the instance to be categorized.  
This type of categorization encourages deductive reasoning, but not inductive 
reasoning.  There is no place for probabilistic induction because there is no place for 
uncertainty. 
Semantic Categorization 
Rosch (Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Rosch, 1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975) has 
suggested another categorization model based on semantics and observation.  While a 
defining feature of classical categorization is the rule of all and only, which 
necessitates sharp boundaries, the semantic categorization model proposes that 
category membership of biological instances is a more graded and probabilistic one 
with fuzzy boundaries and unequal levels of property representativeness among 
category members.  This model does not postulate sharply defined categories.  
11 
 
Instead, a majority of category members possess a cluster of features that are the 
same, but a small number of members require closer inspection to confirm their 
category membership because they have one or more, but not all of the properties in 
the cluster.  In contrast, others might have all.  Within the category of mammals, a 
cow has all the properties we associate with the mammal class, but whales and bats 
are also mammals.  In addition, both the penguin and the house sparrow are members 
of the category bird, but the house sparrow exhibits characteristics such as “wings 
used for flying” that are more common in the majority of biological members of this 
category than the penguin whose wings are used for swimming, thus the sparrow is a 
prototype for a bird, not a penguin. 
Both of these examples represent instances in which the majority of category 
members have a cluster of similar properties that identify them as category members.  
By using this cluster, and allowing for exceptions rather than applying hard and fast 
rules, category membership becomes probabilistic and therefore makes induction a 
necessity and deduction an impossibility.   
This system of categorization is also one in which learning is done by 
induction.  It is proposed that the child observes the natural world and starts to sort 
biological instances first by prototypical exemplars (e.g., sparrow) and then uses this 
exemplar to make inductions to other category members.  Rosch proposes that simple 
features, such as shape, provide the first salient features for category delineation.  
Shape similarity makes it much easier to label as birds those instances that are more 
similar to house sparrow than penguin, further emphasizing the fact that a common 
characteristic of birds, “with wings that fly” is more common to some members than 
12 
 
others and that some members of the category exhibit this trait, but not all.  
Additionally, within the category of bird, some (typical) exemplars of the category 
will possess the most number of similar characteristics, while other members will 
contain progressively fewer.   
By using semantic categorization, learning is always done by induction, never 
deduction.  In this model, the categorizer gains information from the environment by 
observing instances and making inductive associations about salient characteristics.  
Basic information may be presented by the child’s social environment, but it is the 
child who begins to use induction to place other generally similar biological instances 
into category structures. 
Categorization competency is based on the reasoner’s frequency and depth of 
experiences with category members.  It is assumed that others in the environment are 
exposing the child to experiences and exemplars that emphasize primary attributes.  
Exemplars are assigned the most basic perceptual attributes first (color, size) and 
additional information is added as the child matures.  Because this presupposes that 
the child is getting information directly from the environment, this type of 
categorization is considered culturally influenced. It is proposed that the child takes in 
all information that he/she is exposed to and then begins to sort it by looking for 
possible similarities.  Rules are not strictly applied and category boundaries are fuzzy 
and shifting.   
This categorization model assumes that categories are defined by their 
members rather than by predetermined rules. 
13 
 
Concepts as Theories 
The third category schema is “concepts as theories.”  This theory-based 
categorization, applied primarily to the natural kinds categories and commonly 
referred to as essentialism, suggests an intuitive understanding of something unseen 
within a natural kind that makes it what it is.  Whereas classical categorization is 
restricted by a formula, theory-based categorization allows induction and is not 
restricted to perceptual appearance similarity or domain specific knowledge. 
Previously it had been assumed that young children could only categorize by external 
appearances as opposed to adults who appear to categorize by a more complex series 
of theoretical notions.  “Concepts as theories” endows even young children with a 
grasp of essences.  
With essentialism, category members are defined by their essence, which is a 
common, unseen property they all possess and which defines what they are.  
Categorization hierarchies are developed by the individual using both observable and 
unobservable features of the natural kind.  The reasoner is not expected to be able to 
describe or even know what the essence is, but instead is just required to believe that 
it exists (Gelman, 2003).  This lack of knowledge is sometimes referred to as 
placeholder essence (Medin & Ortony, 1989).  Essentialism comprises a skeletal 
conceptual framework (Gelman, 1990; Gelman, 2003, 2004; Gelman & Wellman, 
1991) that is flexible and guides the reasoner to further knowledge acquisition.   
For example, mammals will have hair (observable) and be warm-blooded 
(non-observable).  These features are the direct result of what is understood as the 
essence of the category member.  Because some of these criteria are unobservable, 
14 
 
the reasoner applies inductive strategies to novel instances to determine the 
appropriateness of category inclusion using a theory that all members of a category 
share a particular essence.  In the case of living things (a natural kind) versus 
artifacts, which are not natural kinds, all living things contain something that allows 
them to be alive (e.g., organs, blood).   
The importance of this type of categorization scheme is that it encourages 
inductive reasoning, producing inferences and generalizations about subsequent class 
members. But it also should promote deduction because there is an assumed common 
essence that determines category membership.  
Each of these theories starts with the assumption that the categorizer will take 
information and organize it into categories that make sense to the organizer.  They 
also assume that within those categories, levels of organization will emerge based on 
the frequency and similarity of the criteria that link members of a class.   
Category Levels – Basic, Superordinate, Subordinate  
Within each category structure, there is the potential for basic, superordinate 
and subordinate category levels. These levels are defined by the extent to which class 
members share commonalities, and the extent to which the category is distinct from 
other categories.  
Basic Level 
Taken any group of biological instances, according to Rosch, the basic 
category level is that which is considered most accessible because it has optimum 
coherence as well as distinctiveness. It is defined as the most inclusive where 
members have “ a significant number of attributes in common, motor programs that 
15 
 
are similar to each other, have similar shapes and can be identified by averaged 
shapes of member of the class” (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Bream, 
1976).   
For example, if my categories are flowers, tulips and parrot tulips, the basic 
category is tulips.  This is the category which contains a reasonable number of 
commonalties that make tulips recognizable as tulips, yet distinct from other flowers, 
that is, most of us can identify a tulip from other flowers because it is reasonably 
distinctive from other kinds of flowers such as roses or carnations. Basic categories as 
defined by Rosch et al. (1976) are the earliest categories sorted and named by 
children.  
Superordinate Level   
The category of flowers is the superordinate category because it has high 
distinctiveness and low commonality. There are many plants that are members of the 
category flowers, so there are not many commonalties, but there are numerous ways 
in which the members of this category differ from members of other superordinate 
categories like animals.  
Subordinate Level   
The category of parrot tulips represents the subordinate category level.   
Members of this category contain the most number of commonalties among 
themselves, but they are hardest to distinguish from other varieties of tulips.  
 Property Inheritance 
Figure 2 shows a graphic representation of these levels using circles with 
varying degrees of specificity. The superordinate level is labeled with the number 1 
16 
 
because it consists of all circles and only one feature defines it.  For this example 
circles are defined as “a closed plane curve every point of which is equidistant from a 
fixed point within the curve” (Merriam-Websters, 1993). Any circle of any size or 
any color can be a member of the superordinate level. The members of the class of 
circles can be heterogeneous.  The basic and most accessible level is labeled 1, 2 
because it is defined by both shape (1) and color (2) and consists of red circles.  As 
long as the circle is red, it can be any size and still belong to the basic level. Note that 
there are two commonalities defining the class.  Finally, the subordinate level is 
labeled 1 (shape), 2 (color) and 3 (size).  For a circle to be a member of this level it 
must be large and red, so there are many properties that define the class but the 
classifier must pay attention to all three properties to differentiate these circles from 
other varieties.   
 
Figure 2. Diagram of property inheritance for superordinate, basic and subordinate 
levels. 
 
1 (circle) 
1, 2 (red circle) 
1, 2, 3 (large red circle)
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Note that there is a relationship between the three classes, “1”, “1, 2” and “1, 
2, 3”. The classes lower on the tree diagram inherit the (shape) property of the 
superordinate class, and the subordinate class inherits the shape and color of the basic 
class.  In computer science this state of affairs might be described as class “1” is the 
mother of class “1, 2”.  The analogy is to biological inheritance.   
Natural kinds usually present a more varied picture than colored circles, where 
reasoners must confront biological inheritance in addition to perceptual similarity 
when making decisions. To examine this, Springer (1992) tested children between the 
ages of 4 and 8 to determine if they would favor kinship properties over visual 
similarity.  In these studies, children were presented with a triad of animals, for 
example a large horse and two smaller horses, one of which looked like the larger 
horse but the other did not. The child was told that the dissimilar horse was the ‘baby’ 
of the large horse and that the similar horse was not a member of the same family.  
Children were taught that the large horse had hairy ears and then were asked which 
smaller horse would also have hairy ears.  It was found that children were more likely 
to overlook perceptual similarity and instead invoke a kinship strategy saying that the 
dissimilar, but biologically related horse would share a biological property such as 
hairy ears.  While children were not always able to provide biological reasoning for 
their choices, this study suggests that they are beginning to use kinship and biological 
inheritance as a marker for making inductive reasoning choices.    
The reasons to consider category level are threefold.  First, basic categories 
are more accessible.  By definition, they are the ones that the reasoner considers most 
familiar.  Second, inductions are easier among categories that are less distant in level 
18 
 
from one another.  That is, it is easier to make the inductive leap from poodle to 
greyhound because both animals belong to the same basic class (dog) than it is from 
poodle to sheep where they belong to the same superordinate class (mammal). Thus, 
it might be assumed that category level affects ease of induction and potentially 
deduction. 
Finally, while inductions are category driven, they are also based on 
probabilistic notions when examining natural kinds.  While Figure 2 presents levels 
with discrete parameters, natural kinds can present a more varied array of options that 
the reasoner must consider.   
The following section will show that age, knowledge, and frame or task, in 
addition to underlying theoretical notions, can affect the reasoner’s use of levels, 
including shifting the basic level, as knowledge becomes more complete.   
Previous Research Findings 
The remainder of the chapter is organized into five sections. The first section 
is a review of concepts as theory findings and the implications of this approach to 
conceptualization and reasoning.  The next sections include factors influencing 
reasoning, such as category levels, category labels, argument strength and the 
implications of culture. 
As discussed earlier, natural kinds are a category of living organisms 
consisting primarily of plants and animals.  They possess things inside of them that 
provide information about their functioning. They also possess both observable and 
unobservable properties that are consistent across class or kind.  These traits and 
characteristics are passed down from generation to generation imbuing progeny with 
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similar characteristics.  Finally, these characteristics maintain their consistency over 
time. Whatever characteristics define a parrot tulip will be the same today as they are 
tomorrow.   
The unobservable properties have been labeled an “essence” by Gelman and 
her colleagues.  This essence is defined as the “underlying reality or true nature, 
shared by members of a category, that one cannot observe directly, but that gives an 
object its identity and is responsible for other similarities that category members 
share” (Gelman, 2004).   
The ability to utilize inductive reasoning combined with our ability to 
categorize input allows us to make probabilistic inferences, thereby circumventing the 
need to learn everything from scratch about a new instance.  The research done for 
this study seeks to understand what might affect an individual’s ability to make 
inductions about natural kinds and what underlies induction in natural kinds.  Is 
induction driven by a single theory, such as essentialism, or is it a function of 
knowledge, age, and task or frame?  If it is a function of these factors, can a shift in 
age or knowledge account for children's performance on particular tasks?  These are 
the questions that this research strives to answer.  A review of previous research will 
lay the groundwork for understanding what is already known and how those results 
help to explain the results found in this research.  
Concepts as Theories 
By the mid 1980s, Gelman and others (Gelman 1988; Gelman & Markman, 
1987) had begun to take a close look at young children’s use of induction in natural 
kinds.  Gelman and Markman’s 1987 study tested whether children would expect 
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category members to share an unforeseen property. As stated before, this essence is 
not something that can be seen or touched, but instead it is an unseen force that 
represents life, growth, and certain innate characteristics that separate biological 
entities from artifacts and from each other. For example, an essence would be what 
makes a lion “lion-like.” By understanding that this essence exists, Gelman postulates 
that the young child is able to categorize seemingly different biological entities within 
the same category.  For example, although a poodle and a german shepherd do not 
share the same appearance, a child will recognize both as dogs.  Concomitantly, 
individual people may vary in skin color, body size, or hair texture, but still be 
recognized as people.  But the quandary is in knowing if the child is applying an 
essentialist theory and understanding of something that is non-concrete and unseen or 
simply using perceptual clues combined with previous knowledge as the pathway for 
determining category membership.   
To test this notion, in one experiment researchers (Gelman & Markman, 1987) 
showed 3- and 4-year-old children a picture of a black cat with a white stripe as the 
target clue.  They were also shown other pictures: a black cat with a white stripe 
(same category, similar markings), a cat that looks white (same category, different 
appearance); a skunk (different category, similar appearance) and a dinosaur 
(different category, different appearance).  Children were then a taught a property 
about the target clue (i.e., cats can see in the dark) and were asked if that information 
also applied to the other animals in the task.  Results showed that children at this age 
thought that the two cats saw in the dark, but not the skunk or the dinosaur, proving 
that they could use category information and not simply appearance to make 
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inductions.  Their young age showed that they were unlikely to be depending on 
formal education or scientific knowledge.   
Additional studies (Gelman, 1988) showed that as children age they also begin 
to incorporate knowledge into their judgments of biological kind category.  Two of 
the questions that this study sought to answer were how children limit their use of 
induction and how these patterns change as the child ages.  To test these notions, pre-
school and second grade children learned something about a natural kind (this rabbit 
likes to eat alfalfa).  They were then shown four pictures; same category and 
appearance as the target (brown rabbit), same category, but different appearance 
(white rabbit), same superordinate category (dog) and unrelated category (telephone).  
Children were asked to decide which of other items with varying degrees of similarity 
to the target clue (a rabbit) also liked to eat alfalfa. As one might expect, responses 
from 4-year-olds varied from those of second graders.  Younger children did not 
place as many constraints on their use of induction, however their choices did reflect 
the fact they were more likely to generalize to a similar target clue.  The second 
graders showed the same type of responses; however the important conclusion with 
older children was that they began to show different expectations between natural 
kinds and artifacts.  According to Gelman they began to expect that natural kinds 
would have more similarities in reference to internal parts and behavior than they 
expected from inanimate objects.  The author postulates that this is directly related to 
children’s increased scientific knowledge.  That scientific knowledge is then used to 
augment underlying theoretical notions that children are using, such as essentialism.    
What may be most important in these results is that if children are using their 
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scientific knowledge to separate artifacts from natural kinds, it may also be possible 
for them to use scientific knowledge to influence their thinking with natural kinds 
categories.   
Additional questions about children’s ability to overlook outward appearance 
were studied by Gelman and her colleagues (Gelman & Coley, 1990; Gelman & 
Markman, 1986), with results indicating that children were using a conceptual 
framework that gave credence to underlying unseen essences.  In the Gelman and 
Markman study, perceptual similarity was pitted against category membership.  Four 
and 5-year-olds saw a picture of a tropical fish. They were told that these were fish 
and that they breathed underwater.  A picture of a dolphin, bearing a striking 
resemblance to members of the basic category “fish,” was also shown to participants. 
They were told that it was a dolphin and that it popped out of the water to breathe.  
Children were then shown a picture of a shark that closely resembled the dolphin and 
were told that it was a fish.  They were asked to decide how it breathed.  Results 
showed that children did make correct inferences based on category, and not 
perceptual similarity, and assumed that the fish could breathe underwater, but the 
dolphins could not.  
Gelman and Coley’s 1990 study modified this experiment to determine if even 
younger children would also overlook perceptual similarity.  In this oft-cited study, 2-
year old children were shown a picture of a creature typical of a category that they 
were familiar with, the bird category.  Four other pictures were also presented.  For 
the bird category, children saw a bluebird and a dodo bird.  They were also shown a 
stegosaurus and a pterodactyl (a winged dinosaur that looks like a bird).  Two of the 
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pictures (bluebird and pterodactyl) resembled the target category.  Children were told 
that birds lived in a nest.  In the first condition of this experiment, the label of either 
dinosaur or bird was given to each picture.  In the second condition, labels were not 
given.  For both conditions, children were then asked which animals might also live 
in a nest.  Children were accurate on pictures where the animal was the prototype of 
the category (e.g., a sparrow), but needed labels to be accurate on pictures of atypical 
birds (e.g., dodo bird).  This showed that perceptual clues were important.  However, 
in some cases language clues were necessary.  An expanded review of the importance 
of labeling will be presented later in this chapter; however it should be noted that 
language refined their inductive skills in this task. 
Children’s attention to non-obvious properties and their ability to understand 
the importance or privileged status of these properties were also tested by Gelman 
and Wellman (1991) with 4- and 5-year-old children to understand exactly what types 
of information children might have access to when making inductive inferences.  
These researchers hypothesized that insides and essences, those unobservable 
qualities, were important concepts for children to grasp if they were to overlook 
observable characteristics.  Children were asked if a natural kind would retain its 
identity (would it still be a dog) if its insides were removed (i.e., “What if you take 
out the stuff inside of the dog, you know, the blood and bones and things like that and 
got rid of it and all you have left are the outsides?”) or its outside covering (i.e., 
“What if you take off the stuff outside of the dog, you know, the fur and got rid of it 
and all you have left are the insides?”).  In this experiment children considered the 
insides more relevant than the outside in retaining natural kind identity.  Children 
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were not expected to be able to describe the inside characteristics or its essence or to 
even call it an essence.  The researcher’s only expectation was that children would be 
able to conceptualize the idea that something inside of a natural kind was responsible 
for its continued membership in a particular category.  When children know that 
something internal causes category membership, but are unable to name it, it is called 
the placeholder notion (Medin & Ortony, 1989).  
Gelman and Wellman (1991) argue that while children may have rudimentary 
scientific understanding that allows them to know that there is something inside a 
natural kind, they do not have access to knowledge that would tell them that the 
insides are necessary for functioning and identity.  Consequently, it would also seem 
that age and experience, again, are factors that must be considered as important 
features in children’s inductive reasoning. 
While much has been done to try to prove that children use essentialism in 
inductive reasoning, there have also been detractors who describe flaws in the 
essentialist approach. Critics focus on the kinds of beliefs the child possesses, the 
possibility there are developmental shifts in those beliefs and the role of culture and 
context in affecting the development and use of essentialist notions. 
 It has been suggested that essentialism includes an individual’s belief that 
there are natural kind categories and the belief that there are unobservable “essences” 
that are responsible for observable characteristics that place natural kinds into specific 
categories. However, Strevens (2000) has suggested that essentialism can be 
explained with a “minimal hypothesis” whereby an individual simply assumes that 
kind membership accounts for observable characteristics and causal laws between 
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kind members rather than a causal essence within a kind that forms the basis for 
induction.  Carey (1999) argues that knowledge acquisition can change children’s 
theoretical beliefs.  She cites the work of Inagaki and Hatano (1996) describing the 
theory change that children make by the age of five years when, according to these 
researchers, children begin to unite all living things (plants and animals) into one 
category as they understand more about what it means to be alive including the 
necessity for food and water.   
And, Malt (1994) suggests that natural kind categorization is very much 
influenced by desires and social context.  In one study participants were given a list of 
items (pond water, tea, bath water) and asked to determine the amount of water in 
liquids called “water” (pond water) versus those not called water (tea).  It is suggested 
that while essentialism plays a role in reasoning about water, source, location and 
function also influence individual’s categorization.  Choices varied and responses did 
not necessarily reflect that H20 represented the essence of all things that might be 
considered water.  While water is a natural kind, but not a creature as we have been 
discussing, it still highlights the importance of frame and knowledge and their joint 
impact on categorization.  
In particular, Rothschild and Haslam (2003) suggest that there may be a 
difference between pragmatic essentialism and naturalistic essentialism.  A pragmatic 
essentialism would change based on circumstances and knowledge.  This assumes 
that an essence is not an independent structure that exists within a natural kind.   
What is important for this paper is the understanding that essentialism is not 
necessarily an overarching theory that can be applied in a blanket manner.  Others 
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have suggested alternatives that may account for children’s beliefs and their 
application in inductive reasoning.  Even Gelman, in recent years (2003), has 
suggested that essentialism is a “framework for organizing our knowledge of the 
world.”  She does speculate that adults may continue to utilize a form of essentialism, 
but that it may be modified with age. 
It would be seem reasonable to assume that the framework is adjusted as 
knowledge is accumulated and needs and desires shift.  
 Since Rosch (1975), Carey (1985) and Gelman (1988) first suggested that 
children’s conceptual frameworks might develop differently than was previously 
thought, much research has been done to investigate these shifts and their 
implications for development.    Two task factors that might affect use of essentialist 
reasoning are category levels and category labels.  
Category Levels 
 While children’s underlying beliefs provide a guide to their categorization and 
use of induction, there are other factors that also need to be examined and understood. 
One of those is the level at which children access information. 
As stated earlier, categories can be broken into three levels; basic (the most 
accessible), superordinate (the most encompassing), and subordinate (the most 
number of similarities between the group and the fewest differences from contrasting 
classes).  Basic categories provide the most amount of information to the reasoner and 
also possess the “highest category cue validity,” which makes them the most 
differentiated from one another (Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson & Boyes-Breahm, 
1976).  Superordinate categories can be subdivided into basic categories, which in 
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turn can be subdivided into subordinate categories (See Figure 2).  In this schema, 
dog would be considered the basic level, dalmatian would be the subordinate level 
and mammal (canine) would be the superordinate level.   
In particular, the question is whether the descriptive level of the category 
determines the ease of induction. Building on the idea that categorization might be 
influenced by specific knowledge, Waxman, Lynch, Casey & Baer (1997) examined 
the possibility that pre-school children might be able to extend their knowledge of 
basic level categories to subordinate categories and that this extension would be 
facilitated by teaching children contrastive knowledge about similar subordinate 
members of a basic level.  In this experiment, one of the basic levels that children 
were tested on was butterflies.  All children were taught about blue butterflies and 
white butterflies.  Half of the children were taught that blue butterflies ate fruit and 
white butterflies ate mustard plants.  This was considered contrastive information.  
The second group of children was taught that blue butterflies slept standing up and 
that white butterflies laid eggs shaped like pears.  This is considered non-contrastive 
information.  Both groups were then asked if fritallaries (a type of butterfly) ate violet 
flowers.  Results showed that children who had been taught the contrastive 
information were more likely to agree that fritillaries ate violet flowers (thereby using 
induction to make inferences at the subordinate level), than those who had been 
taught non-contrastive information.  In this case, the type of knowledge influenced 
induction.  
This experiment provides two important pieces of information.  First, it tells 
us that even very young children can make inductions from the basic to the 
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subordinate level and not just across basic level categories.  But more importantly, it 
shows that context (contrastive vs. non-contrastive information) can affect children’s 
reasoning. These results lend credence to the idea that, while children may be using 
an essentialist theory, this theory can be affected by the context of the knowledge that 
they acquire.  
The role of language and children’s inference to category levels was also 
investigated in an early study (Gelman & O’Reilly, 1988).  While the researchers 
sought to understand children’s inclination to infer instances beyond surface 
appearances, results showed an age difference in children’s use of inductive levels.  
In this case, preschoolers through second graders were taught that an apple had 
“auxim" inside. They were then asked if another apple, a fruit and an artifact would 
also have auxim. Inferences were drawn most frequently at the basic level (in this 
case apple), for younger children, while older children were also more able to draw 
inferences about the superordinate level (fruit).  Again, these results showed that as 
children develop and presumably gain more knowledge they are more able to draw on 
taxonomic knowledge to make inductions.  This shift would seem to stem from 
increased knowledge.   
 The importance of these studies is that it appears that knowledge and task both 
serve to influence inductive reasoning ability.  In part, it has been shown that the ease 
with which children use induction depends upon the taxonomic level at which they 
are trying to reason and the knowledge to which they have access.   
Category Labels 
 Category labels allow the individual to determine where certain instances fit 
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into the hierarchical structure and what strategies might be most useful for induction. 
If we refer back to Figure 2, the label circle identifies the superordinate category, the 
label red circle signifies the basic category and the label large red circle designates 
the subordinate category.  The labels provide us with information necessary to make 
other inductions.  
By understanding and utilizing the role of property inheritance, the reasoner is 
able to use labels as a starting point for extending category inferences.  As outlined 
before, whatever defining characteristic is possessed by the superordinate category 
(circle) will also be possessed by the basic and subordinate category, but 
distinguishing properties of the subordinate category of red circles, (large) do not 
define the basic category (red circle).  
Yamauchi and Markman (2000) suggest that categorization is even more 
complex than originally thought with category labels and category features playing 
uneven roles under some circumstances.  In a task where category labels and category 
features (similarity) were pitted against each other, category labels guided 
participants attention and ultimate inferences.  This is consistent with early studies 
(Gelman & Markman, 1986) showing that category membership is not simply feature 
driven, but will also be influenced by common labels assigned to different items.   
As pointed out by Markman and Ross (2003), category development is a 
complex process, not dependent on any one particular learning strategy and in the 
past research has not always addressed this complexity with the attention it deserves.  
They note that labels call attention to properties and entities and provide powerful 
information for placing kinds in specific categories.  For example, knowledge of a 
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label (something is a giraffe) would encourage class inclusion strategies by providing 
a specific natural kind label.  On the other hand information about a feature 
(something has a long neck) would encourage a partonomic relation because we only 
have information about part of the instance (the neck).  In the second case there may 
be many things that have long necks (e.g., giraffes, ostriches, and brontosauruses). 
The studies of labeling (Yamauchi & Markman, 2000, Gelman & Markman, 1990) 
emphasize the importance of context in accessing the knowledge base or conceptual 
theory that undergirds induction.  
 While much of the research described in the previous paragraph was done 
with adults, Gelman and Heyman (1999) showed similar label stability with their 
study of noun versus verb predicate labels in children 5- and 7-years-old.  In this 
study children were given two options for labelling an item.  They were told that 
“Rose eats a lot of carrots.”  They were then told either “Rose is a carrot eater” or 
“She eats carrots whenever she can.”  Both age groups of children agreed that the first 
label, rather than the second, presented a more stable condition.   
This example emphasizes the point that Markman and Ross (2003) have made 
noting that even small word changes in labeling may affect the use of inductive 
reasoning and in the worst case, affect the outcome of study results in an unforeseen 
fashion.  It is important to keep in mind that an individual’s use of a category as the 
basis for induction may be affected by multiple variables and each of these variables 
may carry different weights, even for different individuals within different cultures.   
Argument Strength 
While aspects of categories, such as labels or features, affect category 
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development and use, argument strength also affects that way in which we apply 
inductive reasoning strategies.  Arguments contain one or more premises and one 
conclusion.  The premise is the basis for the argument and provides information 
(hawks have sesamoid bones).  The conclusion is the answer that is derived from the 
premises (all birds have sesamoid bones).  If the reasoner feels that the argument is 
strong they are more likely to use induction to derive a conclusion than if they feel the 
argument is weak.  
 Researchers have identified numerous types of arguments with varying 
degrees of strength that might influence the use of induction.  Osherson and his 
colleagues (Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, & Shafir, 1990) tested the strength of 
categorical arguments by changing the premise and conclusion statements for 
particular arguments.  Each argument contained a specific natural kind category and a 
novel property.  In each case arguments were pitted against each other to determine 
their reasoning strength.  
One example, referred to as premise monotonicity, is shown in the set of 
arguments below.  Set A is the more inclusive set of premises because it mentions 
more birds, thus, it yields more strength than the less inclusive set (Set B).   
Set A.  Hawks have sesamoid bones. 
Sparrows have sesamoid bones. 
Eagles have sesamoid bones
All birds have sesamoid bones 
 
Set B.  Sparrows have sesamoid bones 
Eagles have sesamoid bones
All birds have sesamoid bones. 
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In premise typicality, Set A, containing the more typical bird (robin) is judged 
to be stronger than Set B containing the Penguin. 
Set A.  Robins have a higher potassium concentration in their blood than 
humans
All birds have a higher potassium concentration in their blood than 
humans 
 
Set B.  Penguins have a higher potassium concentration in their blood than 
humans
All birds have a higher potassium concentration in their blood than 
humans 
 
These experiments looked not only at similarity and typicality in arguments 
(Sets A and B), but also diversity in arguments.  Osherson et al. (1990) reported that 
diversity of exemplars within an argument might also strengthen it.  The example 
below is considered premise diversity.  Set A below is a stronger argument than Set 
B.  In this case, lions and giraffes are two natural kinds with a greater distance 
between them than lions and tigers and should provide the reasoner with a greater 
diversity or coverage from which to build their inductive reasoning.   
Set A.  Lions use norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter 
 Giraffes use norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter
Rabbits use norpinephrine as a neurotransmitter 
 
Set B.  Lions use norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter 
 Tigers use norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter
Rabbits use norepinephrine as a neurotransmitter 
 
Lopez, Gelman, Gutheil, and Smith (1992) utilized arguments similar to those 
used by Osherson et al. to determine if kindergartners, second graders and adults 
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would apply strategies in ways similar to those reported. As expected, all age groups 
judged arguments with typical and similar instances to be stronger than ones 
containing atypical and dissimilar instances.  Similarly arguments of typicality and 
similarity where the premise was either very typical of the category (robin is a typical 
bird) or the premise and conclusions were similar natural kinds (horse, zebra/donkey 
is stronger than horse, zebra/squirrel) were considered stronger.  
What is of greater interest to us is that kindergartners did not utilize diversity 
in any form to differentiate argument strength and second graders only used it under 
certain circumstances.  The authors claim this represents an orderly process in the 
development of the use of argument strength.  For our purposes it suggests two 
possibilities.  First is that the framework of any argument may affect the way in 
which it is utilized by reasoners of differing ages.  But it is also possible that this 
represents the ability to make inductions across instances further apart in a hierarchy 
and kindergartners simply do not have the same ability to make inductions across 
instances farther apart in the hierarchy.  
Folkbiology 
 One of the criticisms of the research described earlier in this chapter is that 
frequently participants are either undergraduate students or younger children who 
represent the middle and upper-class majority culture in America.  While there have 
been studies done in other populations (Bailenson, Shum, Atran, Medin, & Coley, 
2002; Choi, Nisbett, & Smith, 1997; Hatano, Siegler, Richards, Inagaki, Stavy, & 
Wax, 1993; Inagaki & Hatano, 1996; Medin & Atran, 1999), they do not represent the 
majority of reported results. 
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Folkbiology, which studies the intuitive theories held by people, seeks to 
remedy this situation by studying people in different cultures.  This section of the 
chapter presents some of the results of folkbiology research that directly references 
inductive reasoning.  These results are cause for rethinking the role that culture and 
experience play in the development of inductive reasoning.  Specifically, they 
highlight the fact that knowledge and frame may influence inductive reasoning. 
While the folkbiology literature reports slightly different terminology, for ease 
of reading, we will continue to use the category levels (basic, superordinate and 
subordinate) that we have used throughout this document.  It is important to note that 
previous folkbiology research (Berlin, 1978) has argued that the subordinate (folk-
generic) level is the most privileged in folkbiology as opposed to Rosch et al. (1976) 
who have shown that the basic level is the most privileged level for the population 
they studied. Thus, there is disagreement between disciplines.  However, it has been 
suggested that this difference in privileged levels is a reflection of greater knowledge 
of natural kinds among certain populations.  This research is discussed below. 
 In a study by Coley, Medin and Atran (1997), the question of privileged level 
in traditional societies versus industrialized urban dwellers and its import to induction 
were examined.  According to Rosch (1975) the basic level is the most privileged 
level because of its high within category similarity, making it the most conducive to 
induction.  It is the level above which substantial information is lost and below which 
little information is gained.  
American college students were compared to the Itzaj Mayans, members of a 
traditional village in Guatemala, in a series of studies.  Participants were told a piece 
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of information about one level of animal or plant and were asked if that information 
applied to other levels.  For example, “If all rainbow trout have protein A, how likely 
is it that all fish have protein A?” or “If all sharks have protein A, how likely is it that 
all fish have protein A?”  Different appropriate natural kinds were used for each 
group of participants.  
According to Coley et al. (1997), a “privileged level would be the highest or 
most abstract level at which inductive confidence is strong.”   That suggests that the 
privileged level for the Itzaj would be the subordinate level and the privileged level of 
the American college students would be the basic level because the Itzaj were closer 
to working with plants and animals. 
Study results were somewhat surprising.  They showed that the subordinate 
levels were privileged for both populations.  This type of result would be expected for 
a traditional society, but not the college students.  The authors suggest that while the 
Itzaj may be basing their inductions on knowledge, the students were using both 
knowledge and implicit expectations, based on language, of what might be in a 
category.   
It is also pointed out that possibly what was measured by Rosch as opposed to 
Coley et al. was different.  In the Rosch experiment, participants were being asked to 
list features which required a certain level of knowledge.  In the Coley study, 
individuals were told information (“If all rainbow trout have protein A, how likely is 
it that all fish have protein A?”) and then asked about their expectations.  This 
experiment much more closely reflects that types of experiments that have been done 
in natural kinds studies. 
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According to the authors, Americans expect subordinate levels (folk generic – 
trout) to be the most useful for inductive reasoning.  In other words, for urbanized 
individuals with little contact with nature, language and expectations may privilege a 
level and not necessarily knowledge. According to these results it would seem that the 
level at while knowledge is accessed is different, but the level at which induction is 
the strongest is the same.  
There are two important notions from these results that deserve consideration. 
First, the authors suggest that one “basic” level for all people may be too simplified a 
notion.  Second is that multiple factors may influence induction, in this case, natural 
kinds, including experience, knowledge and implicit expectations arising from 
category labels.  
 Researchers have also been interested in knowing if the anthropocentrism 
described by Carey (1985) would be found in other cultures, i.e., that humans were 
the prototype for inductive generalizations.  Ross, Medin, Coley and Atran (2003) 
suggested that cultural and experiential differences might affect children’s views of 
the natural kinds.  Because Carey’s original work was done with urbanized children, 
Ross et al. studied majority urban children, majority rural children, and Native 
American children (Menominee) using a projection task similar to Cary’s task, in 
other words, if X has an omentum, does Y?   
Children in three age groups, kindergarten and 1st grade, 2nd and 3rd grade 
and 4th grade, from three different cultural and experiential backgrounds (urban 
majority, rural majority and rural Menominee), were tested.  The protocol consisted 
of five different bases (human, wolf, bee, goldenrod and water).  There were also 16 
37 
 
target objects, for example human, bear, eagle, trout, milkweed and pencil.  Children 
were asked to project five unknown properties, like andro or gluco.  They were taught 
that one of the bases contained a property and then would be asked if the targets also 
contained that property.   
 The overall results showed that both majority culture groups showed some 
anthropocentricism, with rural majority children showing a decrease as they aged.  In 
contrast, none of the Menominee children showed this tendency, even at the youngest 
ages.  This would suggest that both age and experience might affect children’s 
reasoning.  Also of note is the fact that Menominee children frequently gave 
ecological reasoning for some of their responses.  For example, when generalizing 
from bees to bears, they justified this by saying that “a bee might sting a bear, or a 
bear would eat honey.”   
These types of comments are of interest because they suggest that more than 
just biological similarity may influence children when they make inductions in 
biological kinds and that these types of justifications are based on experience and 
knowledge.   
But most importantly, the study showed that relative expertise and interaction 
with the environment, as opposed to limited knowledge (going fishing as opposed to 
reading a book about fish), may have substantial influence on conceptual 
development.  The authors suggest that when exploring cognitive differences, it might 
be wise to study  U.S. college populations not as a baseline, but as a group that 
provides information reflecting an individual’s conceptual development with 
potentially limited natural kinds input.  
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Disendruck (2001) has also studied essentialism with children in Brazil. He 
replicated an earlier study (Disendruck, Gelman, & Lebowitz, 1998) in which 
children were shown pictures of typical and atypical animals of the same species and 
were taught that either two animals had the same internal properties (bones and 
muscles) or that they shared the same external properties (live in the same zoo).  
Children were then taught labels for these animals (e.g., “This is a snake, it is a zava” 
or “This is not a snake, it is not a zava”).  The premise of this research was that if 
children were using essentialism, they would be more likely to infer that animals 
sharing internal properties and being from the same species might also share a 
common label.  In fact, this turned out to be true. 
But the other component of this experiment and the reason for repeating it was 
that in 2001 the study was done with Brazilian children from two different socio-
economic groups, middle class and shantytown.  Results showed that there was no 
difference in reasoning between the two groups.  
However, I would argue that this study is not substantially different from 
those done with children in the United States.  While the socioeconomic status is 
different, their interaction with nature does not vary substantially from other children 
in the U.S. who have been tested.  A more definitive test of cultural influence would 
be between children whose knowledge base differs not only at the level of 
knowledge, but also experience and interaction with nature.  
It is for these reasons that the importance of comparative research cannot be 
underestimated.  Coley (2000) suggests that we need to study adult endpoints to 
understand children’s development and we need to study all of this within different 
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cultures.  Clearly, if age, biological knowledge, the way in which that knowledge is 
obtained (experience versus classroom) and the context of the task are to be 
considered, we need to reconsider the way in which we test children to discover if 
they do use essentialism in inductive reasoning about natural kinds.  
I would agree with Coley (2000) that we do not yet fully understand the 
confounds in research in inductive reasoning and that careful attention to knowledge, 
the way in which it is obtained, participant age and context of studies may all play a 
substantial role in our understanding of inductive reasoning.  The studies in this paper 
begin to address three of these variables; logical conjunctions, frame, and age. 
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Chapter 2: Background Research 
As discussed in Chapter 1, previous research has examined the child’s 
understanding and knowledge of certain non-obvious general characteristics that 
would maintain life and support growth and reproduction in all animals (Gelman, 
1988, 2003; Gelman & Coley, 1990; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Simons & Keil, 
1995).  Utilizing this type of a causal theory it is claimed that even a 2-year-old can 
employ induction to make generalizations from one animal to another.  If a child is 
taught that one animal has an omentum, they could infer that other categorically 
similar animals might also have an omentum.  But what enables the child to do this?  
In an effort to examine some of the variables that might influence a child’s reasoning, 
Scholnick, Hammond, and Fener developed an experiment to look at several 
important research questions.  
To support any claim that the child is using an essentialist theory of natural 
kinds to make inductions it is important to determine, first, whether the child has an 
understanding of biological taxonomies.  Is the child able to accurately categorize 
natural kinds into a taxonomy that would show an understanding that poodles are a 
subset of dogs and that dogs are a subset of animals and that animals are a subset of 
living things?  If children can accurately categorize, is this understanding related to 
the type and extent to which the child makes inferences across natural kind 
categories?  Finally, if biological concepts are embedded in a causal theory that 
enables inductions, this theory should also support deductive competence.  Thus, one 
would expect linkages between categorization, induction, and deduction during 
development. The primary questions considered in the first study were: 
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1. What is the course of development of knowledge of biological categories? 
2. What is the course of development of induction? 
3. What is the course of development of deduction? 
4. How are these three developmental skills related?  
It was hypothesized that the level at which the child is able to make accurate 
categorical sorts constrains the extent to which the child is able to make accurate 
inferences about biological kinds.  In other words, the child who can only identify 
dogs can only make generalizations across the category titled “dogs.”  Is the inverse 
also true?  Will the child who is able to accurately categorize subordinate, basic, and 
superordinate categories of natural kinds also be able to make inferences across these 
categories if given information at the basic level?  Moreover, if the ability to make 
inductive judgments exists and is theory driven, this theory should also be applied in 
deduction.  Finally, what is the relationship between these three skills? 
Method 
Participants 
Three age groups were tested for Study #1.  The first two groups consisted of 
24 7- to 9-year-olds (M = 8.4 years) and 24 10- to 12-year-olds (M = 11.4 years). 
Children who participated in the study came from several areas including the 
University of Maryland Summer Arts Program and neighborhoods in High Point, 
North Carolina; Silver Spring, Maryland; and Potomac, Maryland. 
 A third group was also tested.  This population consisted of a total of 36 
University of Maryland undergraduate students evenly divided between males and 
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females (M = 19 years 1 month). All cohorts were evenly divided between males and 
females.   
 All participants or parents/guardians signed consent forms. 
Deduction Warm-up Task 
To assure that all participants were capable of both inductive and deductive 
reasoning and to familiarize them with the testing procedure, each participant was 
given two warm-up tasks.  The first task tested deductive reasoning.  During this task 
the subject was seated across from the examiner.  On a table in front of the subject 
were two stacks of cards.  One stack contained only cards with green backs.  The 
second stack contained cards with purple backs and cards with green backs.  The 
examiner held a separate set of both purple and green cards in her hand with only the 
backs showing.  The stacks on the table were presented so that the subject could 
easily determine that only one of the stacks contained purple cards.  The following 
instructions were given to each of the participants. 
This is a thinking game.  Let me show you how it works.  I have two 
stacks of cards.  This stack (examiner points to the stack with only 
green cards) is where the green cards belong, but this other stack 
(examiner points to the stack with both purple and green cards) can 
have purple or green cards.  Here are some other purple and green 
cards (examiner shows the subject cards that she holds in her hand) 
that were left on the table by someone else.  Someone took some of the 
cards out of each stack.  I want you to return the cards to the way they 
were before.  Can you figure out which stack the person got the cards 
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from?  You know that if it’s a purple card, it came from this stack 
(examiner points to the stack of mixed cards).  Let’s see if we can 
figure out where these cards came from or if there’s not enough 
information to tell.  Remember, if it is a purple card, it came from this 
stack (examiner points to stack of mixed cards).  
The instructions read to the subject establishes the P therefore Q equation. 
“If it is a purple card (P) it came from this stack (of mixed cards) (Q).”  The examiner 
asked a series of four deductive questions (MP, MT, DA, and AC) to determine if the 
subject understood and was capable of deductive reasoning.  (See Chapter 1 for 
complete description of each deductive syllogism.) 
For example, the examiner held up a purple card.  She reminded the 
participant that “If it’s a purple card, it comes from this stack” (pointing to the mixed 
stack of cards).  She then pointed to the stack of only green cards and asked the 
participant if the card in her hand came from that stack with only green cards.  If the 
participant understands deductive reasoning, then the obvious answer is no (Modus 
Tollens).  The examiner would then hold up a green card, remind the participant again 
“If it’s a purple card, it came from this stack” (pointing to the mixed stack of cards).  
She would point to the stack with only green cards and ask the subject if the green 
card in her hand came from that stack.  
Because it is impossible to arrive at an absolute answer, the correct response 
can only be that there is no way to tell (Deny the Antecedent).  If participants 
answered the first four questions correctly, the deductive warm-up was considered 
complete.  The examiner had three card sets containing four cards each.  She shuffled 
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the cards within each set and also shuffled the three sets before each subject was seen.  
Participants were given up to 12 tries to master this task, and were given feedback if 
they answered incorrectly.  All of the participants successively mastered this task 
within twelve tries.   
Induction Warm-upTask 
The same set of purple and green cards was used to perform the inductive 
warm-up task.  The green target card was placed face down on the table.  The subject 
saw only the back of the green target card on which there was a geometric design 
consisting of thin solid lines and thin dashed lines.  The backs of the cards in the 
examiner’s hand displayed geometric designs with varying similarity (and hence 
inductive “proximity”) to the target card.  The participant was given the following 
instructions. 
This card (the target card) has a circle on the other side.  Some of these 
cards have a circle too (examiner is referring to the cards in her hand).  
Could you tell which has the circle without turning the cards over?  
Tell me which ones have the circle on them.  We’ll put those in the yes 
box.  Which ones definitely don’t have the circle on them?  We will 
put those in the no box.  Those for which there is not enough 
information to tell we’ll put in the not enough information to tell box. 
 
Each card from the examiner’s hand was then individually placed next to the 
target card and the subject was asked to determine if there was definitely a circle on 
the other side of this card, if there definitely was not a circle on the other side, or if 
there was no way to tell.  These response options were given to the participants in 
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random order.  Cards were placed in the appropriate marked boxes (yes, no, no way 
to tell) depending on the subject’s response and left there to be recorded on the score 
sheet after all tasks were completed. 
Because induction is based on probabilistic inference, there would be no 
reason to eliminate any participants based on their responses to the induction warm-
up task. 
Main Tasks – Deduction/Induction 
 After the warm-up tasks were completed, participants were given the primary 
set of tasks that included both inductive and deductive problems.  Two different sets 
of cards, with intermingled inductive and deductive questions, were used for this test. 
The subject saw only the back of each card, which was blank. All cards were shuffled 
between participants to address order and stimulus effects. Participants were given the 
following instructions 
Now we need to sort some other things.  Each time I will tell you a 
clue and then ask you to sort things.  Can you use the clue to help me 
figure out where to put the cards? (The examiner gestures to the yes, 
no and no way to tell boxes used earlier.)  I have to warn you that 
sometimes the clue will tell you the answer and sometimes the clue 
just doesn’t give enough information.  Let’s see if we can figure out 
where these cards belong or if there’s not enough information to tell. 
 
Verbally presented induction problems included: (a) a clue, (e.g., “If it is a 
blue jay, it has vitamin K inside”), (b) additional information, (e.g., “This is a 
parrot”), and (c) a question, (e.g., “Does it have vitamin K inside?”).  Reasoners could 
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respond by answering yes, no, or no way to tell.  The 16 induction problems were 
divided into two sets.  Each set was anchored by a different primary clue (blue jay or 
poodle).  Participants began with poodle or blue jay based on a previously assigned 
code.  There were a total of eight secondary queries for each primary clue.  Four of 
these secondary queries were couched in generic terms such as “another bird,” while 
the additional four used more specific exemplars such as “parrot.”  All of the 
secondary clues were of varying categorical distance from the primary clue.  Tables 1 
and 2 display this information in detail. 
 
Table 1 
Inductive Reasoning Specific to Specific 
 
Primary Clue: If it’s a blue jay, it has vitamin K inside 
___________________________________________ 
 
Type of Level 
 
Categorical Distance 
 
Secondary Clue and 
Questions 
Same Basic Level 
 
Another bird 
 
This is a parrot. Does 
it have vitamin K 
inside? 
Same Superordinate 
Level 
 
Another animal 
 
This is a horse. Does it 
have vitamin K inside? 
General Level 
 
Another living thing 
 
This is a rose. Does it 
have vitamin K inside? 
Artifact 
 
Non-living thing 
 
This is a chair. Does it 
have vitamin K inside? 
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Table 2 
 
Inductive Reasoning Specific to General 
Primary Clue: If it’s a blue jay, it has vitamin K inside 
___________________________________________ 
 
Type of Level 
 
Categorical Distance 
 
Secondary Clue and 
Questions 
Same Basic Level 
 
Another bird 
 
This is another bird.  
Does it have vitamin K 
inside? 
Same Superordinate 
Level 
 
Another animal 
 
This is another animal. 
Does it have vitamin K 
inside? 
General Level 
 
Another living thing 
 
This is another living 
thing. Does it have 
vitamin K inside? 
 
Artifact Non-living things This is something. 
Does it have Vitamin K 
inside? 
Four deductive problems were generated from each primary clue (8 total 
deductive problems) by changing the (a) secondary clue and (b) query to produce 
Modus Ponens (MP), Modus Tollens (MT), Deny the Antecedent (DA), and Affirm 
the Consequence (AC) (e.g., “This is not a blue jay.  Does it have vitamin K 
inside?”).  Table 3 lists the deductive clues and answers for one set of deductive 
problems. 
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Table 3 
Deductive Reasoning Task 
 
Primary Clue: If it’s a blue jay, it has vitamin K inside 
___________________________________________ 
 
Deductive Syllogism 
 
Secondary Clue and 
Question 
 
Correct Answers 
Modus Ponens 
(MP) 
 
This is a blue jay.  Does 
it have vitamin K inside? 
 
Yes 
Deny the Antecedent 
(DA) 
 
This is not a blue jay.  
Does it have vitamin K 
inside? 
 
There is no way to tell 
Affirm the 
Consequence 
(AC) 
 
This has vitamin K 
inside.  Is it a blue jay? 
 
There is no way to tell 
Modus Tollens 
(MT) 
 
This does not have 
vitamin K inside.  Is it a 
blue jay? 
 
No 
Deduction and induction problems with the same primary clue were 
intermingled to achieve the desired embedded task.  The cards for both 
induction and deduction queries appear the same to the subject and the order 
of the questions were randomized.  Both induction and deduction tasks were 
repeated using the same format, but with a different primary clue and 
questions (e.g., “If it’s a poodle, it has biotin inside.  This is a german 
shepherd.  Does it have biotin inside?”).   
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Categorization Task 
 The final task consisted of a series of 16 cards that contained pictures of the 
living and non-living items in the previous task in addition to other items in each of 
the categories.  The participant was asked to sort the cards by the following four 
categories: birds, dogs, animals and living things.  The order in which the participants 
were asked to sort by category was randomized. 
Relevant Results from Study #1 
Analysis of the data provided results germane to the initial questions.  
1. What is the course of development of knowledge of biological categories? 
 
All the participants could identify all the exemplars that fit under categories at 
each level of the taxonomy.  Even the youngest children understood and implemented 
appropriate natural kinds categorical sorts. 
 
2. What is the course of development of induction? 
 
Analyses of “yes” responses (inductions) revealed a significant effect of age, 
categorical distance, and their interaction, F(6, 234) = 3.18, p <. 005.  More 
inductions occurred for exemplars of the same basic level – another bird (29%), with 
progressive decreases for following levels including same superordinate – another 
animal (10%), living things (7%), and inanimate objects (3%).  Inductions decreased 
with age. 
 
3. What is the course of development of deduction? 
 
Both age and problem type jointly affected correct deductions, F(4, 156) = 
8.13, p <. 001. MP responses were virtually perfect and MT performance was 
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uniformly high (83-91%), but correct DA and AC answers increased from the 
youngest (48%) to the oldest group (73%). Thus deductive skill improved with age. 
 
4. How are these cognitive skills related? 
 
Individuals were credited with deductive skill if they solved every problem 
based on one premise and with inductive skill if for one clue, an inference was made 
to the closest exemplar and the strength of endorsement decreased with categorical 
distance.  Deductive competency rose from 8% of the eight-year-olds, to 46% of the 
11-year-olds, and 69% of the college students, but inductive skill dropped from 67% 
of eight-year-olds to 46% of 11-year-olds to 17% of college students.  Induction and 
deduction were not correlated. 
There were several important differences between this experiment and those 
that have been done in the past.  Previous studies have not offered the subject the 
opportunity to say, “there is no way to tell” when asked for an answer.  By requesting 
a “yes” or “no,” the subject is forced into a response.  It was interesting to note that 
the youngest children with the least amount of scientific sophistication were least 
likely to utilize the “no way to tell” responses while adults were most likely to use 
this response.  Second, our warm-up inferential task utilizes solid and broken lines 
that may provide more abstract stimuli than natural kinds from which to make 
inferences.  All age groups found it easier to make inferences using these abstract 
designs, than they did using biological kinds.   
However, even on the warm-up task, the youngest children made more 
inferences than adults.  A sub-population of the college students declined to say that 
any of the cards in the inductive warm-up task had a circle on the other side, although 
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the instructions to each subject clearly stated that some of the cards in the examiners 
hand did, indeed, have a circle on the other side. 
 Finally, past experiments have used visual stimuli when asking participants to 
use reasoning to make inferences.  It is possible that visual stimuli fostered inferences 
while this verbal task may have inhibited induction.  These verbal stimuli required 
that participants utilize their own stored schema when deciding whether to infer 
anything about the relationship between the clue and the question.  By not supplying 
any visual stimuli the participant has nothing except their own conceptual 
representations from which to develop categories.  The lack of visual stimuli in the 
embedded task also potentially increased the level of difficulty and stifled induction. 
It is possible that participants performed better on the two warm-up tasks because 
they used visual stimuli, albeit abstract ones. 
In an attempt to look at some of the initial questions about reasoning and 
natural kinds, the first study by Scholnick, et al. carefully examined the validity of the 
claim that young children’s concepts are embedded in a causal theory.  If these 
inductions are guided by a theory, then that same theory should also support the use 
of deductive strategies.  The results of this earlier research project prompted 
additional questions to surface regarding variables that might constrain the use of 
reasoning in solving problems or generalizing to other categorical inferences. 
The specific questions asked by the research in Study #2 follow from the 
results of Study #1, but they place the research in a different framework. Study #1 
was situated within a neo-nativist approach to essentialism which assumes that there 
are no developmental differences in reasoning and no differentiation between the 
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capacity to reason and the use of inductions or deductions. In Study #2, there are 
factors that might prompt reasoners of different ages to employ induction and 
deduction. By incorporating these factors the study was designed to determine what 
factors may have influenced the results of Study #1 and if the task presentation may 
have hindered inductive reasoning.  
The first experiment produced results that were not totally expected.  It 
became apparent from the data that the development and use of inductive and 
deductive reasoning did not appear to be related.  In addition, while adults are thought 
to be skilled in inductions, very few were willing to use induction as a reasoning 
strategy for natural kinds.   
To selectively examine factors that may have played a role in influencing the 
use of both inductive and deductive reasoning, Study #2 was changed in four specific 
ways including the presentation of the inductive and deductive tasks, the number of 
levels available to the participant, and the addition of two new variables:  the 
language of reasoning and frame. 
Study Design and Task Modifications 
Three modifications were undertaken to deal with methodological issues. 
First, the task presentation was changed to separate the inductive and deductive 
reasoning tasks.  In Study #1 these tasks were embedded.  It was a concern that 
embedding the induction and deduction tasks may have confused participants and 
potentially inhibited their inductive reasoning performance.  Because deduction  
focuses on deterministic reasoning and definite answers, it might inhibit the 
probabilistic generalizations that induction requires. Although it could be argued that 
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the inductive tasks could have potentially influenced deduction, the college students 
did well on MP and MT tasks and performed as expected on the two tasks, AC and 
DA where probabilistic reasoning was relevant. Thus it was unlikely the induction 
task depressed deductive performance.  To address this issue, in Study #2 tasks were 
presented in a serial format with induction always presented first and deduction 
second. Thus the inductive task was closer in format to the tasks used by Gelman to 
address induction for natural kinds. 
Second, in Study #2  the targets of induction and deduction were expanded. 
The study used a format similar to Study #1 where the task presentation had included 
a target clue (blue jay, poodle). Participant choices had included questions about 4 
generic (another bird, another animal, another living thing, something) and 4 more 
specific (parrot, horse, rose, chair) possibilities.  Study #2 also included target clues 
(dalmatian, siamese), but instead of 4 generic and 4 specific choices, Study #2 
included 6 specific choices for each target clue with varying degrees of biological 
resemblance from the target clue.  These specific choices are listed in Table 4, shown 
later in this section.  In the first study it could be argued that the jump from bird to 
animal or parrot to horse was substantial.  Therefore, the second study inserted 
additional levels that would allow an analysis of more finely grained responses from 
participants. All target clues continued to contain a novel property.  For dalmatians 
this property was magnesium and for siamese it was biotin. 
A third format change was the use of drawn pictures of animal stimuli as 
opposed to strictly verbal clues used in the first study.  This was done for two reasons.  
First, there was a concern that using only verbal cues drew too heavily on 
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participant’s mental representations and may have made the induction task too 
difficult.  Pictures provided a more concrete reference for participants.  Second, the 
use of pictures was also used to more closely reproduce the format of some of the 
earlier essentialism studies. 
Additionally, the study was situated in a different theoretical context which 
focused on the factors that might influence the use of a potentially available reasoning 
strategy. Study #2 included two additional variables that were considered to have a 
potential impact on the reasoners responses: logical conjunctions and situational 
frame.  The syntax used in Study #1 was expanded to include either if or all to 
determine if the phrasing of the primary clue might have influenced the type of 
reasoning used.  The first experiment presented the clue as an if sentence.  When 
reasoners were told, “If it is a poodle, it has biotin inside” induction might have been 
restricted if they interpreted this clue to mean, “If and only if this is a poodle, it has 
biotin inside.”  To examine this potential problem Study #2 was constructed to 
compare clues with different wording.  Half of the participants heard clues phrased as 
if statements (“If they are siamese, they contain biotin.”).  The other half heard 
statements phrased as all statements (“All siamese contain biotin.”).  All, like if 
conveys the same conditional logic. The word if, which signals probability, might be 
more conducive to inductions whereas all, which implies a class inclusion relation, 
might be more conducive to deduction. 
A second new variable that was included for Study #2 was the situational 
frame that participants were asked to use when they responded to the examiner’s 
questions.   
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Analysis done on the first experiment revealed that the use of inductive 
reasoning was inversely related to the age of the participant.  Young reasoners 
showed some use of induction whereas adults showed almost none.  It was 
hypothesized that the frame in which the task was placed and the participants 
imagined themselves might affect the reasoner’s willingness to take a chance on a 
potentially incorrect answer.  Because induction requires arriving at an answer that is 
not an absolute truth based on available information, one possible explanation for this 
result is that older reasoners were less likely to risk what they perceived might be an 
incorrect answer.  In the first study adults did not hesitate to answer deductive 
questions with “yes” or “no” answers, especially when they were sure that they were 
correct, but when answers became uncertain they were more hesitant.   
It was interesting to note that very few of the youngest children responded 
with “no way to tell” when asked if a chair contained vitamin K.  Although they had 
not been given any more information than the adults, they were willing to state that 
the chair did not contain vitamin K.  In fact, many laughed at what they considered a 
silly question.  At the same time, a majority of the adults responded “not enough 
information to tell” when asked this question further emphasizing their hesitation to 
respond in situations where they did not possess unequivocal facts.  
Because the adults tested in the first experiment were all university students, it 
was also a concern that the educational experience of students, which encourages 
deductive reasoning and penalizes wrong answers, influenced their reaction to the 
task.  Although students understood that participation in the experiment was the only 
criterion for receiving credit, it was a concern that they had not felt free to take a 
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chance and possibly give a wrong answer under the experimental conditions of the 
first study.   
While college students were not specifically tested in Study #2, it was 
possible that older children and in some cases even younger children might have 
similar concerns.  By placing participants in specific frameworks that differed from 
their normal persona, we hoped to determine if frame influenced their reasoning 
strategy.  
Two specific frame scenarios were developed.  In the first scenario 
participants are asked to see themselves as scientists doing experiments thereby 
encouraging the use a scientific mode of thinking commonly associated with 
deductive reasoning.  The second scenario placed the tasks in the frame of a risk 
taking investor who owns a pet store.  By using the risky investor scenario, it was 
hoped that participants would be more willing to take a risk, and possibly utilize 
inductive reasoning.  This does not assume that all risk taking behavior encourages 
inductive reasoning, or that inductive reasoning is necessarily associated with risky 
behavior.  It does, however, present a scenario in which the boundaries of correct and 
incorrect answers may be considered less rigid.  
These task modifications allowed for the analysis of both inductive and 
deductive data by age, frame (scientist/pet store owner) and logic syntax or reasoning 
language (if/all).  
There was a final modification of study #1, the choice of sample. Because the 
folkbiology literature points to the possibility that culture and knowledge of nature 
(Coley, 2000) may have an impact on reasoning with natural kinds, a rural population 
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was used to further determine if some of the results from Study #1 would persist with 
a different population. While the first study also included college students, Study #2 
sought to examine whether groups that were closer in age (children and young 
adolescents) would show the same transition seen between children and adults found 
in the first study.  In addition, because the children in Study #2 lived in a rural setting 
they potentially differed in experience from the typical college sample coming from 
diverse geographic regions and it would be inappropriate to compare the younger 
groups with the college students 
Within each age cohort individual children were assigned to one of four 
groups: Scientist/If, Scientist/All, Pet Store Owner/If, Pet Store Owner/All.   
The warm-up task from Study #1 was not included.  The original purpose for 
task had been to determine if all participants could successfully do both induction and 
deduction.  Because all participants were successful in Study #1, there was no need to 
repeat this task for Study #2.  
Participants 
Two age groups from a rural area outside of Albany, New York were selected 
for this study.   
The two groups in Study #2 consisted of 40 7- to 9-year-olds (M = 8 years 4 
months, SD = 9 months) in grades 2, 3 and 4 and 40 11- to 13-year-olds (M = 12
years, 6 months, SD = 11 months) primarily in grades 6, 7 and 8.  The younger group 
was evenly matched between males and females; the older group contained 42 
females and 38 males.  
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Students were allowed to participate in the study if they returned a consent 
form (Appendix 1) signed by a parent or legal guardian.  Testing time was 
approximately 25 minutes per child. 
All participants met individually with an examiner in a quiet room at their 
school. All children heard the Assent Form (Appendix 2), letting them know that they 
could end their participation at any time.  One child chose to end participation early. 
These data were not included and a replacement child was recruited to maintain the 
sample of 80 children. 
Induction Task 
The induction portion of the task in Study #2 included a set of 24 stimuli.  
These stimuli were separated into two groups, each with its own target clue 
(dalmatian or siamese).  Each of the target clue sets included 12 stimuli with 
decreasing levels of biological resemblance to the target clue.  There were 6 different 
levels of resemblance with 2 instances at each level.  These instances were pretested 
on a sample of young children to determine if, given the label, they could pick out the 
picture card which corresponded to it.  The specific stimuli are listed in Table 4 on 
the following page. 
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Table 4 
Exemplars at Each Inductive Level for Each Target Clue 
 
Target 
 
Level  Dalmatian Siamese  
Specific Epithet  German Shepherd 
Poodle 
 
Short haired cat 
Long haired cat 
Family  Fox 
Wolf 
 
Lion 
Tiger 
Order  Skunk 
Panda 
 
Raccoon 
Seal 
Class  Cow 
Giraffe 
 
Pig 
Elephant 
 
Phylum  Eagle 
Turtle 
 
Parrot 
Frog 
 
Animal 
Kingdom 
 Crab 
Grasshopper 
Lobster 
Spider 
 
Each child was also randomly assigned to one of four groups that determined 
the conjunction and frame and order of stimulus presentation.  In each group, the first 
two conditions determined the frame that would be used.  The second two conditions 
determined the logical conjunction assigned to each child. Children were also 
assigned to groups that determined the order of the target clues. The second two 
assignments included either Cat/Cat, Dog/Dog, Cat/Dog or Dog/Cat.  If a child was in 
the Cat/Cat group, they would hear the inductive cat target clue and stimuli first, 
followed by the inductive dog clue and stimuli.  They would also start the deductive 
portion of the task with the cat clue and follow it with the dog clue for the deductive 
task.  All students participated in all portions of both the inductive and deductive 
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tasks.  Order of the stimulus presentations within each task (e.g., within the cat task) 
also was randomized. 
Children began the induction task by hearing the introduction script and the 
script specified by their logical conjunction/frame group assignment beginning with 
the cat or dog clue designated by their clue order assignment. The following 
represents a sample induction script with a Scientist/If format.  In this example the 
Scientist/If “cat” version is given.  Other sample scripts are shown in Appendix 3.   
Introduction Script 
We are interested in how kids think.  So we have created a set of 
games that we would like to play with you that will help us understand 
how kids take science information that they have learned and apply it 
to other examples.  We will be telling you something new and asking 
you to decide if that information is true in other situations too.  Do you 
have any questions? Are you willing to participate in this experiment? 
If you decide at any point that you need to stop, please let me know 
and we can stop playing the game.   Okay, let’s play. 
Scientist/If Script 
You are a careful scientist who works in a laboratory. You know that 
some animals have biotin inside them. Animals with biotin are very 
important to your research. Everyone is interested in animals with 
biotin! You have a friend who has told you some valuable information. 
He pulls out a picture and says “If they are siamese, they contain 
biotin.” (show picture of siamese cat to child and place on table) You 
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need to find out what else has biotin so you can make important 
scientific discoveries and become famous. You don’t have a lot of time 
or money and not everything has biotin, so what are you going to test? 
After hearing the script, children were shown the series of animal picture 
stimuli to determine their willingness to use inductive reasoning in biological 
categorization. .  They were shown pictures of animals noted in Table 4 and heard 
“Remember that if it is a siamese/dalmatian it has biotin (magnesium).  What about 
(fill in animal name).  Would you say (a) I predict this has biotin (magnesium) (b) I 
predict this doesn’t have biotin (magnesium) (c) I want to wait before I predict.” 
Both animal picture cards and response cards were shuffled before each participant 
and presented in random order.  
Deduction Task 
The second portion of the experiment tested the deductive skills of the 
individual.  This portion was presented immediately following the inductive task. 
Participants continued with the same frame and logical conjunction that they heard in 
the induction section of the experiment.  Because showing an actual picture would 
reveal the answer to a deductive syllogism, a task was developed that asked the 
deductive questions without visuals.   
The examiner held a large book, similar to a picture book, and pretended to be 
reading from the book and examining it as though it contained pictures.  To the 
participant it appeared that the examiner was looking at pictures and asking for help 
in making some appropriate decisions.  The examiner was actually reading from a 
script and asking the participant about animals starting with the subordinate level 
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(dalmatians or siamese).  After the script for an individual level was read, the 
examiner asked the respondent to respond with 1) definitely yes, 2) definitely no or, 
3) no way to tell.  These options were also presented in random order across the entire 
deductive set so that approximately a third of the time the first option was definitely 
yes, a third of the time the first option was definitely no, etc.  
The deductive task always began with the questions at the subordinate level 
and advanced to the basic level and then the superordinate level.  The examiner asked 
the participant the four deductive syllogisms (MP, MT, DA, and AC) for each level in 
random order.  Below is a sample script for the deductive task. 
For continuity of this section, this script maintains the Scientist/If format. 
 
Subordinate Level Script: Siamese 
 
After you have been experimenting for a while you know that “If they 
are siamese, they contain biotin.” You tell a friend, but she’s puzzled 
and says, “Show me what you mean”. She gets out a book of pictures 
and asks some questions.  For each of her questions you can tell her 
definitely yes, definitely no or there is no way to tell. Can you help 
her? 
• These are siamese, do they have biotin inside them? 
• These are not siamese.  Do they have biotin inside them? 
• These have biotin inside them.  Are they siamese? 
• These do not have biotin inside them.  Are they siamese?” 
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Basic Level Script: Cats 
While you are answering the questions, you realize that “If they are 
cats, they have biotin inside them.” You tell your friend and she pulls 
out a new set of pictures to really help her understand your 
information.  She looks at the pictures and asks you questions.  You 
need to tell her if the answer should be definitely yes, definitely no or 
wait to predict.   
• These are cats.  Do they have biotin inside them? 
• These are not cats.  Do they have biotin inside them? 
• These have biotin inside them.  Are they cats? 
• These do not have biotin inside them.  Are they cats?” 
 
Superordinate Level Script: Animals 
Finally, she says, I think I understand this information.  “If they are 
animals, they have biotin inside them to help them grow.” How will 
she act based on these statements? As she flips through the pictures 
she says “These are animals.”  Will she decide that they have biotin 
inside?  Definitely yes, definitely no or wait to predict. 
• These are animals.  Do they have biotin inside them? 
• These are not animals.  Do they have biotin inside them? 
• These have biotin inside them.  Are they animals? 
• These do not have biotin inside them.  Are they animals?” 
64 
 
Once the child has completed both assessments the examiner asks the child if 
they have any questions and answers them as appropriate.  Figure 3 graphically 
represents the flow of the experiment. 
 
Figure 3. Graphic representation of experiment flow and group assignment. 
Pet Store 
Owner 
Scenario
Scientist 
Scenario
Introduction and Consent Form
IF ALL IF ALL 
2 Induction Tasks
• Dalmatian Target at 6 Levels 
• Siamese Target 6 Levels 
2 Deduction Tasks
• Dalmatian Syllogism at 3 Levels 
• Siamese Syllogism at 3 Levels
Debriefing
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Chapter 3: Analyses 
Research Questions 
Study #2 examines the following four research questions: 
1) What is the influence of age on the use of induction and deduction in relation to 
natural kinds? 
2) Are deduction and induction related skills?  
3) What effect does the inclusion of more or less constraining logical conjunctions in 
the problem statement have on the use of induction and/or deduction in natural kinds? 
4) What effect does the assumption of a more or less constraining situational frame 
play in the use of deduction and/or induction in natural kinds? 
The first two questions address the same issues as Study #1 and allow 
comparison of the results across studies.  The third and fourth questions examine the 
influence of logic syntax and frame on the development and use of inductive and 
deductive reasoning.  
Return to the Questions in Study #1 
 1) How do age differences affect the use of induction and deduction in 
relation to natural kinds? 
Repeated measures ANOVAs were used to assess age differences with age, 
script (scientist/pet store owner), logical conjunction (if/all) and child gender as 
between participant variables.  Inductive and deductive reasoning distance from the 
target clue and degree of difficulty were the repeated measures.  Significant main 
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effects were explored by follow-up independent samples t-tests.  All repeated 
measures are reported using Huynh-Feldt corrected statistics.  
Induction – Age 
Unlike deduction, inductive distances from the target and problem difficulty 
are represented by the same variable.  Because of this, only one inductive variable is 
necessary for analysis, and is characterized as the number “yes” responses to animals 
with an increasing distance of biological resemblance from the target item. The 
method of analysis was a 2(age) x 2(conjunction) x 2(frame) ANOVA  with 1 
repeated measure, the 6 different levels of cue distance. Similar to results found in 
Study #1, age was determined to be a significant factor in the use of induction, F(1, 
75) = 5.62, p=.02 with an observed power of .65.  There was also a significant 
interaction of age and inductive distance, F(4.66, 349) = 3.41, p = .01 with an 
observed power of .89.   
Younger children made inductions at further distances from the target stimuli 
more frequently than older children.  Using independent sample t-tests for further 
analysis (Table 5), this difference is significant at the fifth t(78) = 3.69 (p<.001) and 
sixth t(78) = 2.26 (p<.01) induction distances as illustrated in Figure 4 on the 
following page. 
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Table 5 
Mean Number of ‘yes’ Responses by Distance of Induction and Age (max. = 4) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Distance/Category 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
t(78) = 
Younger   Older Younger Older t p
1. Specific Epithet 2.95 3.25 1.24 1.06 -1.16 .25 
2. Family 3.03 2.98 1.12 1.31 0.18 .86 
3. Order 2.13 1.73 1.40 1.18 1.38 .17 
4. Class 1.85 1.68 1.29 1.16 0.64 .53 
5. Phylum 1.98 1.00 1.25 1.11 3.69     .001*** 
6. Animal Kingdom 1.20 0.60 1.18 0.93 2.53  .01** 
** .p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
Figure 4. Relationship between age and level of induction reached  
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Deduction – Age 
While the induction analysis combines distance and difficulty in the same 
variable, deduction must be analyzed differently.  The four types of deductive 
problems represent different degrees of difficulty, although not with the evenly 
measured spacing of the inductive task.  For example, MP restates the problem and 
MT inverts it, while DA and AC require the reasoner to consider all permissible 
instances that the initial premise allows.  The content of individual problems also 
reflects the differing distances from the target clue: superordinate (animal), basic 
(cat/dog) and subordinate (siamese/dalmatian).   
The first analysis of deductive reasoning accuracy examined problem 
difficulty and found results similar to those in Study #1.  Using a repeated measures 
ANOVA with accuracy in each of the four types of deduction (MP, MT, DA, AC) as 
repeated measures, and age (7- to 9-year-olds and 11- to 13-year-olds), script 
(scientist/pet store owner), logic syntax (if /all), and child gender as between subjects 
variables, age is again shown to be a significant factor F(1, 75) = 20.22, p = .001 with 
an observed power of .99.  Additionally, using the Huyhn-Feldt statistics, there was a 
significant interaction of deductive accuracy and age, F(2.33, 23) = 10.25 p < .001
with an observed power of .99.  Using independent t tests, means for MP and MT 
were similar across age; however those for DA and AC show significant differences 
with older children superior on the two indeterminate inference problems (Table 6).  
Figure 5 shows a graphic representation of these data 
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Table 6 
Mean Number of Correct Deductions by Age and Problem Difficulty (max. = 6) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Problem Difficulty 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
t (78) = 
Younger   Older Younger Older T p
1. Modus Ponens 5.70 5.83 0.65 0.45 -1.01 .32 
2. Modus Tollens 4.97 5.03 1.14 1.25 -0.19 .85 
3. Deny the 
Antecedent 
 
0.78 2.40 1.31 2.11 -4.14 .001*** 
4. Accept the    
Consequence 
 
0.45 1.85 0.99 2.06 -3.88 .001*** 
p<.001*** 
Figure 5. Mean number of correct deductions by age and type of deductive 
syllogism 
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The second variable, deductive distance, was also analyzed in a separate 
ANOVA.  This variable, consisting of accurate deductions at three specific distances 
from the target clue (Subordinate, Basic, Superordinate), was used to examine the 
number of correct deductive responses with respect to distance from the target clue. 
Using a repeated measures ANOVA with 2 ages (7- to 9-year olds and 11- to 13-year 
olds), 2 scripts (scientist/pet store owner), 2 conjunctions (if/all) and (2) child genders 
as between subject variables and distance from the target clue as the repeated 
measures, age continues to be a significant variable F(1, 75) = 18.43, p = .001, but no 
interaction with level of abstraction was significant F(1.83, 137) = .96, p = .38.   
Deduction and Induction as Related Skills   
2) Are deduction and induction related skills?  
It is notable that the two age groups differed in their pattern of performance 
with younger children making more inductive inferences and older children 
performing more accurate deductive inferences.  These data suggest that the ability to 
accurately perform either inductive or deductive reasoning is directly related to age 
and that the two types of reasoning are not related with respect to natural kinds.  
Because deductive reasoning is measured both by problem difficulty and 
distance from the target clue, it follows that a correlation matrix to examine the 
relationship between the distances of each type of reasoning is reasonable.  To 
examine this, a correlation matrix including distance from the target clues for both 
induction and deduction was run with age partialled out.  Table 7 shows the 
significant findings. 
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Adjusted for age, correlations of inductive and deductive distance showed 
sparse significance revealing only 3 significant correlations out of 15 correlations. 
Skill in making deductions at the deductive subordinate (p = .02) level was 
significantly related to a propensity to make inductive inferences to members of the 
same family (inductive level 2).  However, people who were good at making 
deductions at the subordinate (p = .05) and basic (p = .05) deductive levels were less 
likely to make inductive inferences between animals who shared a class relation 
(inductive level 4). It should be noted that most of the correlations between deduction 
and induction across instances distant in the taxonomy were negative. 
While significant, these relationships do not appear to represent a pattern that 
would suggest any correlation between the development of inductive and deductive 
reasoning in relation to natural kinds.  
 
Table 7 
Intercorrelations between Distance Levels for Deductive and Inductive Task 
 
Inductive 
Distance 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
Participants (n=77) 
 
1) Ded. – 
Subordinate 
 
.11 .27* -.07 -.22* -.20 -.05 
2) Ded. – 
Basic 
 
.04 .18 -.07 -.22* -.13 -.03 
3) Ded. - 
Superordinate
.11 .15 .05 -.18 -.13 -.05 
p<.05*  
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New Analyses from Study #2 
New Variables from Study #2 
 The second set of questions involves the additional variables that were 
incorporated into Study #2, reasoning language and frame.  It was hypothesized that 
these variables would affect the use of induction, but not deduction in natural kinds. 
 3) What effect does the inclusion of more or less constraining logical 
conjunctions in the problem statement have on the use of induction and/or deduction 
in natural kinds? 
Induction — Logical Conjunctions 
It was proposed that presenting the initial information in a sentence with either 
if or all would affect the way respondents perceived permission and would ultimately 
lead to a difference in their use of induction.  Specifically, it was hypothesized that 
the presentation of factual information framed as an all sentence would facilitate the 
use of induction whereas the presentation of factual information framed as an if 
sentence would constrain the use of inductive reasoning.  
An examination of the data, using a repeated measures ANOVA with 2 ages, 
2 frames, 2 conjunctions and 2 child genders as between subjects variables, did not 
reveal any significant difference between the if and all groups F(1, 75) = 0.05, p = 
.82.  Additionally, no interactions with conjunctions were seen F(4.66, 349) = 0.37, p 
= .82.   Independent samples t tests shown in Table 8 showed similar results.    
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Table 8 
Mean Number of ‘yes’ Responses by Distance of Induction and Reasoning Language 
(max. = 4) 
Distance/Category 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
t (78) = 
If All If All t p
1. Specific Epithet 3.05 3.15 1.22 1.99 -.39 .70 
2. Family 2.90 3.10 1.41 0.98 -.74 .46 
3. Order 2.03 1.83 1.25 1.36 .69 .50 
4. Class 1.78 1.75 1.21 1.26 .09 .93 
5. Phylum 1.58 1.40 1.22 1.34 .61 .54 
6. Animal Kingdom 0.93 0.88 1.14 1.07   .20 .84 
Deduction —Logical Conjunctions 
It was also predicted that that the use of the words if or all in the initial 
premise would not cause any difference in the use of deduction when reasoning about 
natural kinds.  Because deduction is reasoning with a specific answer, the phrasing of 
the stimulus should not influence the responses.  Two repeated measures 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 
ANOVAs, using the same between subjects variables, were used to analyze deductive 
difficulty and distance, similar to analyses used to examine the influence of age.   
As predicted, there was no significant effect on the level of performance 
related to problem difficulty (MP, MT, AC, DA) achieved by reasoners in relation to 
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deduction F(1, 75) = 1.73, p = .19 nor was there any interaction F(2.33, 335.50) = 
1.24, p = .29.  Further analysis by t-tests showed similar results (Table 9). 
 
Table 9 
Mean Number of Correct Deductions by Reasoning Language and Problem Difficulty 
(max. = 6) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Problem Difficulty 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
t (78) = 
If   All If All t p
1. Modus Ponens 5.73 5.80 0.60 .52 -.60 .55 
2. Modus Tollens 5.00 5.00 1.18 1.22 .00 .15 
3. Deny the 
Antecedent 
 
1.27 1.90 1.75 2.06 -1.46 .61 
4. Accept the    
Consequence 
1.05 1.25 1.52 1.97 -.51 1.00 
Deductive problem distance was also examined.   The effect of reasoning 
language was not significant, F(1, 75) = 1.53, p = .22, nor was there an interaction 
with any variable F(1.83, 137) = .29, p = .73. Table 10 shows additional t tests 
confirming these findings. 
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Table 10 
Mean Number of Correct Deductions by Reasoning Language and Distance (max. = 
8) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Deductive Problem 
Distance 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
t (78) = 
If   All If All t p
1. Level 1 - 
Subordinate 
4.58 5.00 1.412 1.75 -1.19 .24 
2. Level 2 –  
Basic 
4.40 4.60 1.150 1.46 -0.68 .50 
3. Level 3 - 
Superordinate 
 
4.03 4.28 1.423 1.63 -0.73 .47 
4) What effect does the assumption of a more or less constraining frame play 
in the use of deduction and/or induction in natural kinds? 
Induction — Frame  
It was predicted that participants who perceive frame scenarios with few rigid 
boundaries (pet store owner) might be more likely to use induction as a reasoning 
strategy in a task involving natural kinds than those who perceive a more rule bound 
frame (scientist).  Because induction is reasoning from the specific to the general, it 
always holds the potential for inaccuracy and can be perceived as an intellectually 
riskier option.  The data to address the question were extracted from the same 
ANOVAs described in the previous paragraphs. 
While there was no main effect of frame F(1, 75) = 1.17, p = .48, the data did 
reveal an interaction that approached significance using the Huynh-Feldt statistics 
F(4.66, 349) = 2.23, p = .06 with an observed power of .70.  The results of t tests  
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(Table 11) show significance only at the specific epithet level.  Figure 6, on the 
following page, shows this relationship. 
Table 11 
Mean Number of ‘yes’ Responses by Distance of Induction and Frame (max. = 4) 
Distance/Category 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
t (78) = 
Scientist Pet Store Scientist Pet Store t p
1. Specific Epithet 2.80 3.40 1.29 0.93 -2.39 .02 
2. Family 3.20 2.80 0.99 1.38 1.49 .14 
3. Order 1.83 2.03 1.32 1.29 -0.69 .50 
4. Class 1.90 1.63 1.28 1.17 1.00 .32 
5. Phylum 1.40 1.58 1.26 1.30 -0.61 .54 
6. Animal Kingdom 0.78 1.02 1.03 1.17 -1.02 .31 
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Figure 6. Mean number of correct answers for inductive levels by frame 
Deduction - Frame 
It was also predicted that the use of different frames would have no effect on 
either the use of deduction in relation to difficulty or distance in natural kinds.  
Because deduction can only produce an absolute answer, risk should not affect the 
outcome.  This proved to be true, and no significant differences were found between 
either the scientist or pet store owner scenarios whether the ANOVA analyzed the 
impact of problem difficulty or distance from the target.  In each case, data were 
analyzed using a repeated measures ANOVA with 2 ages, 2 frames, 2 types of 
reasoning language and 2 child genders as between subjects variables.  Results are as 
follows; for distance, F(1, 75) = 0.003, p = .96, F(1.83, 137) = .85 and for difficulty, 
F(1, 75) = .001, p = .97, F(2.24, 174) = .10, p = .93.  Tables 12 and 13 showing t-test 
results did not show any significance. 
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Table 12 
Mean Number of Individual Correct Deductive Answers by Frame and Distance 
 (max. = 8) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Deductive Problem 
Distance 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
t (78) = 
Scientist   Pet Store Scientist Pet Store t p
1. Level 1 - 
Subordinate 
4.85 4.72 1.44 1.75 .35 .73 
2. Level 2 –  
Basic 
4.55 4.45 1.26 1.38 .34 .74 
3. Level 3 - 
Superordinate 
 
4.03 4.28 1.66 1.40 -.73 .47 
Table 13 
Mean Number of Individual Correct Deductive Answers by Frame and Problem 
Difficulty (max. = 6) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Problem Difficulty 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
t (78) = 
Scientist Pet Store Scientist Pet Store t p
1. Modus Ponens 5.75 5.78 0.54 0.58 -.20 .84 
2. Modus Tollens 4.95 5.05 1.24 1.15 .06 .95 
3. Deny the 
Antecedent 
 
1.60 1.58 1.84 2.04 .13 .90 
4. Accept the    
Consequent 
1.18 1.13 1.74 1.79 -.37 .71 
Neither scenario played any discernable role in the use of induction or 
deduction, with age being the only consistent marker over all groups.  
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Chapter 4: Discussion 
As noted before, it is claimed that natural kinds are organized into an intuitive 
hierarchical taxonomy that encourages inductive reasoning.  Although there are 
occasional novel exceptions that do not appear to fit neatly into the taxonomy such as 
whales, that are mammals but look like fish or bats that are also mammals but look 
like birds, most instances share both observable and unobservable characteristics that 
allow them to be easily placed into categories.  These factors encourage the use of 
induction in natural kinds. 
Influence of Age on Induction 
Although neo-nativists claim that young children use an intuitive theory of 
natural kinds as the basis for making inductions, numerous researchers (Carey, 1985; 
Gelman, 1988, 2003, 2004; Lopez, Gelman, Guthiel, & Smith, 1992; Medin, 1989; 
Medin & Atran, 1999; Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, & Shafir, 1990) have shown 
that multiple variables such as age, culture and reasoning strategy may influence 
inductive reasoning.  In this discussion, the results of Study # 2 are reported within 
that framework.  These results include developmental changes related to age on 
inductive and deductive reasoning; the relationship between these two types of 
reasoning; the impact of presenting that information as an if or all statement; and the 
influence that frame (pet store owner, scientist) might have on reasoning strategies. 
The following discussion draws from research cited in the first chapter to assist in 
understanding what role each of these variables might play in the development of 
inductive and deductive reasoning.  
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In both Study #1 and Study #2, age was a significant factor, with younger 
individuals being more likely to make inductions at greater distances from the target 
clue than older participants.  But, older children were more likely to make correct 
deductions. These findings indicate that age may be a factor in children’s use of 
inductive and deductive reasoning. In the Study #1, younger participants (8- to 11-
year-olds) made more inductions at farther distances from the target clue than college 
students. While the age comparison proved to be significant, the age difference 
between these groups provided too substantial a gap to pinpoint a specific transition 
period when children might shift from using more induction to using less induction in 
relation to natural kinds.  In Study #2, the age distance between the two groups being 
compared (7- to 9-year-olds and 11- to13-year-olds) was reduced, providing an 
opportunity to more clearly determine when children might make a transition to 
different inductive reasoning strategies.  However, age continued to be a significant 
factor, with younger participants in Study #2 being more willing than older 
participants to extend inductions to animals with less biological resemblance and 
older participants behaving similarly to the college students in Study #1.  Because this 
age variable is significant, it is important to consider why age might be a factor and 
what processes might be involved that would account for this difference.  
 One possibility is that the conceptual basis of the biological taxonomy 
changed.  
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Reported Age Shifts  
Essentialism 
Gelman (2003, 2004) claims that young children use a representational, 
causal, placeholder form of essentialism to draw conclusions about natural kinds.  In 
this version of essentialism children tap their understanding of an unobservable 
essence within the animal that allows it to have the characteristics that give it 
category membership.  For example, what makes a lion “lion-like?” A causal essence 
may be the “substance, power, quality, process, relationship, or entity that causes 
category-typical properties to emerge and be sustained” (Gelman, 2004).  Children’s 
lack of complete scientific understanding of this essence is labeled as a place holder 
notion.  It has been shown (Asuti, Solomon, & Carey, 2004; Keil, 1989) that children 
are aware that this essence remains constant across time and within generations.  If 
we are to assume that essentialism is utilized by children to make inductions about 
natural kinds (see Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004; Strevens, 2000 for alternate arguments), 
then one thing that remains unclear is whether this theory is used continuously 
throughout development and potentially into adulthood, even in a modified form, as 
suggested by Gelman (2003) or if it is altered, or is possibly inhibited by concurrent 
developmental changes and at what point this potential modification in thinking 
occurs.   
Since the 1980s, Gelman and others have presented numerous experiments 
exploring essentialism as a possible explanation regarding children’s use of inductive 
reasoning in natural kinds.  One crucial variable in this research has been the age of 
the participants.  The majority of studies have been done with children who are no 
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older than third grade and primarily under the age of seven.  There is a good reason 
for this.  To be able to claim that children are using an essentialist theory, researchers 
have sought to show that scientific knowledge is not a confounding influence on 
children’s inductive thinking.  The only way to do this is to test children who have the 
bare minimum of scientific sophistication.  It stands to reason that the younger the 
child, the less likely that their reasoning would reflect any impact of biological 
knowledge.   
Taxonomy  
 Some studies have reported that children’s understanding and applications of 
strategies for inductive reasoning do appear to shift with age.  When determining 
children’s understanding of basic and subordinate class inclusion, Johnson and 
Mervis (1997) concluded that although task as well as age can impact responses, by 
age 7 children’s responses were similar to those of adults.  It was also at this age that 
knowledge of biological taxonomies appeared to influence children’s choices.  
Gottfried, Gelman, and Schultz (1999) speculated that children progressed from an 
essentialist form of beliefs to a more biocentric approach to biological concepts by 
the age of eight.  Even in Gelman’s original work (1988), it was noted that by second 
grade inductive inferences were influenced by more elaborate domains of scientific 
knowledge. According to Gelman, this did not imply that children failed to draw upon 
a theoretical notion of essentialism to guide their thinking.  Instead she argued that 
this new level of knowledge simply meant a change in the “sophistication and 
complexity of their inferences.”  Others disagree and claim there are shifts.  For 
example other researchers, (Sloutsky, 2003; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004a, 2004b; 
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Sloutsky & Spino, 2004) who adamantly argue that children do not use essentialism 
and instead depend on subtle perceptual clues when reasoning about natural kinds, 
claim that by age 7 or 8, children appear to be shifting even their perceptual strategy 
and starting to look more like adult reasoners.  
 Studies in argument strength also show differences based on age and 
experience.  This may reflect fewer levels in the hierarchy for some children or the 
fact that the individual does not take the whole taxonomy into account when doing 
induction.  
Descriptions of argument strength in Chapter 1 showed that the utilization of 
argument strength is not the same across age levels, reflecting difference in the ability 
to use taxonomic knowledge to reach conclusions.  While Osherson et al., (1990) 
showed adults using diversity, similarity, typicality and sample size, studies with 
children by Lopez et al., (1992) were not able to replicate these results.  It appeared 
that kindergartners did not use either diversity or sample size as an inductive 
heuristic.  Second graders were able to use diversity and sample size, but only if the 
examiner supplied the superordinate category which encompassed the diverse 
instances.    
 It would appear that in order to use diversity a certain level of knowledge is 
necessary.  The reasoner must be able to understand and develop superordinate 
categories.  This knowledge grows and changes with time and experience.  Thus 
previous researchers have suggested that there may be an age shift in the use of 
inductive strategies. 
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Cultural Influences 
If we assume, as others have, the increasing age also portends an increase in 
knowledge we must also acknowledge that some groups, for example the Itzaj 
Mayans, gain a breadth and depth of knowledge at a different rate than the U.S. 
population.  As noted in Chapter 1, direct experience with natural kinds may produce 
a different level and type of knowledge than what is normally found in an academic 
environment.  And in the Menominee culture, even young children have been shown 
use reasoning strategies based on their different and more complete understanding of 
the biology in their environment.  This directly influences their use of inductive 
reasoning (Ross et al., 2003). 
Research in the folkbiology tradition has also shown that the influence of 
knowledge is not simply one of expertise.  The use of that expertise may also 
influence induction by showing that individuals may construe biological categories 
differently.  Atran’s studies (1999) in folkbiology with the Itzaj Indians show a 
different side of induction within a society where adults may not possess specific 
scientific knowledge as Western culture defines it, but do have an intimate 
acquaintance with different plants and animals.  The Itzaj categorize natural kinds 
into species-like groups in a taxonomic hierarchy, but the taxonomy differs from the 
Linnean taxonomy.  Additionally, the Itzaj people also use an induction strategy that 
references their own environmental needs, dependence, and interaction with the 
natural kinds environment.  For example, when asked about certain arboreal animals 
(spider monkeys, howler monkeys, coatimundi and kinkajou) which do not belong to 
the same scientifically classified family, the Itzaj classified them as being part of the 
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same category because they are tree dwellers (Coley et al., 1999). By doing this they 
organized animals in a way that reflected their environment and interaction with these 
animals, not necessarily a scientific taxonomy.  Their responses were similar to 
participants in Malt’s 1994 study where respondents categorized water based on its 
function and location rather than its actual chemical makeup.  Thus if inductive skill 
is based on the scope of generalizations, the scope is different for different cultures. 
Does Knowledge Facilitate or Inhibit Inductions? 
If, as Gelman claims, knowledge should allow children to draw upon a more 
complex theoretical base grounded in increased knowledge, then all of the preceding 
would argue that older children would make more inductions across a wider scope of 
instances.  But the results of Study #2 show just the opposite.  Perhaps it is possible 
that in some cases increased knowledge actually inhibits inductive reasoning.  Or 
maybe the shift is more subtle than we have been able to measure.  Possibly the shift 
takes place as a variety of factors converge including natural kinds knowledge, skill 
in applying different strategies for reasoning and experience in the natural world.  
From a developmental standpoint it is important to understand how children 
develop theories or strategies that they use to apply inductive reasoning in natural 
kinds.  And all researchers have suggested that knowledge plays a role in this use.  
What has not been answered is whether this role changes over time and if it does, 
when does it change and why does it change then?  Study #2 would seem to suggest 
that children do start to use a different strategy at they approach early adolescence.  It 
could be argued that their knowledge base has increased at this point and are therefore 
they are more constrained in their reasoning.  Essentially, they know more and at the 
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same time they know more about what they don’t know.  It may also be that younger 
children’s lack of complex knowledge within specific categories allows them to use 
induction at further levels of biological resemblance.  In the expertise literature (Chi 
& Koeski, 1983; Gobbo & Chi, 1986) the hierarchy of experts is more differentiated 
with a greater number of levels, i.e., there is greater inductive distance between a dog 
and a wolf for the individual specializing in canine mammals and the differences 
between related categories are more prominent making generalizations harder.  To 
test this would require looking at what children know that is the basis for induction, 
i.e., their causal theories and perceptual analyses. 
More importantly, this study used stimuli with even greater divergence from 
the target clue than previous research and found an age difference between pre- 
adolescents and younger children for categories that were further from the core 
example. These are the instances not usually employed by Gelman.  While the data 
from Study #2 do not reveal exactly what strategy children are using, what it does 
suggest is that whatever strategy is being employed shifts as they age and one index 
of this is the extent to which they will make inductive generalizations.   
Influence of Age on Deduction  
For deductive reasoning the age trend was reversed with older children 
scoring significantly higher on the two more difficult forms of deductive reasoning 
(AC and DA) compared to younger children, although neither group showed a 
difference when measured on deductive distance from the target clue.  In other words, 
children performed as would be expected on the deduction task.  Framing the task in 
terms of basic, subordinate or superordinate categories did not make a difference in 
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successful completion of the task.  One limitation of this task was that the 
superordinate tasks came later than basic level tasks, but the logic of inference should 
have been the same. 
Young children are able to distinguish between inductive and deductive tasks 
(Galotti, Komatsu, & Voelz, 1997) and report feeling more certain of their answers in 
deduction when presented with syllogisms.  As stated before, deductive skill and 
confidence in that skill increases as children age.  Study #2 confirms this finding; 
however age does not guarantee complete deductive success as reflected in the first 
study’s statistics of a 67% success rate for college students.  This, too, is a common 
finding in the literature (Johnson-Laird, 1995).  
The more interesting result is the continued dichotomy between age and 
success with different types of reasoning. Although the groups in the second study 
were even closer in age than those in the first study, there was still a statistical 
difference in age for successful deductive reasoning.  As the correlation analysis 
showed, while there was very modest correlation on a few levels, overall it appears 
that induction and deduction are not correlated, confirming the results of the first 
study.   
It should, however, be noted that while there was an age effect it was not a 
sharp dividing line between the different age cohorts and that the age difference that 
was seen took place in the two categories farthest from the target clue.   
Role of Reasoning Language in Induction and Deduction 
The first experiment pointed to a clear differentiation between deduction and 
induction.  On closer inspection, it was thought that the way in which the stimuli were 
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presented might have influenced, and possibly constricted, the reasoner.  By using the 
word all to encourage greater inclusion and contrasting it with the word if to show 
greater reasoning constriction, it might be possible to show that reasoning language 
was influencing the reasoning outcomes.  While language can have a powerful 
influence on the way in which people perceive categories (Gelman, & Heyman, 1999) 
this was not shown to be the case with if and all, two conjunctions which are used to 
link categories with a property.  Neither age group was influenced by the change in 
conjunction, leading to the speculation that other factors were influencing the 
difference in successful reasoning.  
It was also predicted that because deduction should not be influenced by logic 
syntax, that deduction performance would not be different between the if and all 
groups.  This proved to be the case for both deductive distance and deductive 
difficulty. 
Role of Frame in Induction and Deduction 
A third variable examined was that of a change in the framing of both 
reasoning problems.  Study #2 contained 2 frames, Pet Store Owner and Scientist. 
The hypothesis was that frame would affect the reasoning of natural kinds.  This 
strategy was based on results from the first experiment and informal discussions with 
college student participants in the first experiment who made few inductions although 
they were clearly at an educational level that would allow them to make reasonably 
educated guesses.  On more than one occasion they made no inductions at all, even on 
closely related items.  Discussions revealed that they attributed this to their current 
learning strategies (e.g., there is a potential for retribution for guessing anything that I 
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don’t know as fact).  The youngest children (5 to 7-year-olds) did not express this 
concern, but it was possible that children between the ages of 7 and 9 were beginning 
to perceive the penalties of guessing as they advanced in school.  
These informal observations suggested that it was possible that external 
influences besides knowledge or theory could be influencing the use of induction, 
especially if college students perceived, correctly or not, that incorrect answers 
carried consequences that they sought to avoid.   
Because all of us use induction in our daily lives and some have argued that 
induction can be implemented differently under different circumstances (Malt, 1994; 
Sloman, 1993), the college setting could be construed as artificially constraining.  If 
that was the case, there might be other factors that were also artificially constraining 
induction.  In order to address that issue, it was hoped that the two different frames 
would provide results that showed that induction could be influenced if people 
perceived that they had a different environment (more restrictive, less restrictive) in 
which to make decisions.  
The results of the analysis of frame are mixed. Story frame did have a 
significant impact with pet store owners (i.e., the riskier group) eliciting more 
induction than the scientists.  This result would seem to point to the possibility that 
frame; even one suggested by an experimental design and not directly related to an 
individual’s day to day life, can have some influence on the willingness to use 
induction in natural kinds.  However the influence of frame did not go beyond the 
first level of induction.  At that level the pet store owners (riskier group) were the 
most willing to make inductions. However, the data suggest that induction can be 
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influenced by artificial frame changes.  If that is true, then it would seem that a theory 
alone could not be the basis for inductions, nor knowledge alone. Other factors might 
also enhance or deter the reasoner’s use of induction.  The only obvious differences 
seen for these groups were at the specific epithet level, but the important point is that 
while modest, this finding does suggest that artificial frames can be a factor in 
reasoning.   
While the scenarios presented for this experiment were developed to enhance 
a change of framework to elicit either more or less risky choices, it is possible that 
younger and older children did not imbue them with the same degree of risk.  Future 
experiments could be enhanced by including a separate measure of risk taking that 
determined the individual’s initial proclivity for risk taking to determine how the 
scenario either enhanced or thwarted normal tendencies.   
While much has been done to examine the influence of previous knowledge, 
age, and visual perception, a measure of environmental influences has been sparse.  It 
would enhance the research to incorporate these measures as part of the total picture 
when understanding this portion of the ‘why’ question when examining the results of 
natural kinds categorization research.  
Summary 
The nature of underlying reasoning for the use of induction and deduction in 
relation to natural kinds is of great interest and controversy.  It is possible that an 
unchanging abstract essentialist theory is not the basis for the use of induction.  This 
study has shown that age and context may both play a role in the development and 
use of induction.  That suggests that children are not basing their inductions in natural 
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kinds solely on an underlying unchanging theory, but instead are using a dynamically 
changing theory and accumulating information in concert with frame influences to 
arrive at reasoning decisions. If essentialism were the basis of children’s 
understanding of natural kinds, their use of induction should be constant. Instead their 
use of induction decreases.   
The findings in this study do not support an essentialist or neo-nativist theory 
of conceptual development.  Essentialism does not explain why children go from 
using induction to limiting their induction. Either the child’s theory and knowledge or 
their uses of theoretical assumptions and factual information have changed. Studies of 
essentialism have used progressively younger children, while ignoring older children.  
It is with these older children that we see essentialism fall apart.   If children know 
that natural kinds have essences that define them, why would they ignore this as they 
get older? Perhaps their knowledge stresses the differences among organisms. 
Perhaps they have learned to be more cautious about making inductive leaps. They 
prefer solid evidence. Consequently children may be using the content knowledge 
that they gain to restrict their induction while they simultaneously use their increased 
understanding of logic to increase their deductive skills. This finding would support 
Piaget’s claim that abstract deductive reasoning emerges slowly and is found only in 
older children and adults. Piaget (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, 1964) would also doubt 
that young children would base their reasoning on abstract theoretical concepts.   
Instead, these results may lend credence to proponents of the IP model.  
Children appear to change and refine their reasoning strategies as they age. They get 
better at deduction and they are more cautious about induction.  It is possible that as 
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they gain experience with reasoning and expand their content repertoire, they become 
clearer about the kinds of conclusions one can draw from evidence. Alternatively 
their knowledge is organized differently. Older children and experts have a more 
refined hierarchy with greater differentiation of levels. The refinement may also block 
inductions. We know differences in induction exist but the data do not pinpoint the 
source of the differences, in knowledge, strategy or willingness to make inductions.  
The intriguing question of exactly why and when children go from a more expansive 
use of induction in natural kinds to a more restrictive use as they age still remains.  
More importantly, if the assumption that broader use of induction in 
combination with strong deductive skills is the basis of discovery, how do we use this 
knowledge to encourage older learners to maintain their use of inductive strategies 
while giving them the tools to use it in a thoughtful and accurate manner rather than a 
restrictive way that inhibits their ability to make the inductive jumps?  What specific 
barriers are keeping them from using inductive reasoning and how do we thwart those 
barriers?  
There are, of course, limitations to this study.  While scenarios used in the 
induction task between pet store owner and scientist were carefully matched and 
designed to elicit risk and non-risk frame environments for children, I believe that 
there is the potential for developing more effective scenarios that might elicit even 
stronger results.  In addition, future research could also develop inductive and 
deductive tasks that are more closely matched.  Study #1 embedded induction and 
deduction tasks so that the focal instances closely resembled one another.  But it was 
possible the child became confused about the kind of reasoning to use.  In Study #2 
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the tasks were separated but the deductive tasks spanned fewer levels.  Despite the 
methodological differences, the data in Study #2 replicated the initial study.  
Nevertheless it would have been better to have made the induction and deduction 
tasks more similar and to have balanced the order of presentation.  Additionally, in 
future experiments I would discuss with each child why they made the choices they 
did.  These responses could be coded and examined to see if children are able to 
identify their own thinking strategies and if those responses predict the level of 
induction or deduction shown in the analysis. 
The results of this study are preliminary, and more research is necessary to 
determine if use of induction is a combination of many of the puzzle pieces suggested 
by other researchers in addition to this study.  It seems plausible that both nature and 
nurture play a role and possibly play that role differently depending on the age of the 
individual.  This is a complex problem that requires a careful look and continuing 
research to determine the answers.  
As Houde (2000) pointed out, the mind is a “jungle where a variety of 
competencies in the infant, child and adult are likely at any moment to collide, to 
clash, to compete (at the same time as they are being constructed).”  That internal 
change in combination with environmental input might possibly be what is driving 
the development of inductive and deductive reasoning in relation to children and 
natural kinds. 
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Appendix 1 
PARENTAL PERMISSION FORM 
How Children Think about Animals  
I wish to allow my child to participate in an experiment of reasoning being conducted under the supervision of 
Ellin Scholnick, Ph.D. in the Department of Psychology at the University of Maryland, College Park.  
The purpose of this research is to study how reasoning skills develop in children.  It explores how people apply 
information that they know to new situations.   
The procedure involves one session approximately 25 minutes in length.  During that time my child will participate 
in 2 critical thinking tasks. In each task my child will be told information about one animal and their job is to 
figure out whether the same information applies to other animals.  For example, if they know something about one 
bear, would it tell them something about another bear or a bee? During both tasks a trained examiner will give 
your child information about specific animals and then ask your child how this information applies to other 
specific animals. The experiment will be done during class time and will not have any effect on your child’s grade. 
All information collected in this study is confidential to the extent permitted by law.  I understand that the 
information provided will be grouped with other information and that my child’s name will not be used. 
Participation in the project involves minimal risks. 
The experiment is not designed to help me or my child personally, but to help the investigator learn more about 
children’s reasoning. My child is free to ask questions or withdraw from participation at any time and without 
penalty. My child may decline to answer any of the questions and will not be penalized in any way. 
Investigator Contact Information: 
Ellin Scholnick, Ph.D. 
University of Maryland 
Professor 
1119 Main Administration Building 
College Park, Maryland 20742 
301-405-4252 
escholni@umd.edu
Investigational Review Board Contact Information: 
If you have questions about your child’s rights as a research subject or wish to report a research-related injury, 
please contact: 
Institutional Review Board Office 
University of Maryland 
College Park, Maryland 20742 
(e-mail) irb@deans.umd.edu; (telephone) 301-405-4212 
NAME OF PARENT  
SIGNATURE OF PARENT  
DATE   
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Appendix 2 
 
ASSENT FORM 
 
How Children Think about Animals
Thank you for participating in our study.  We are going to do two tasks that have to 
do with animals. In each case I am going to tell you information about one animal and 
your job is to figure out whether the same information applies to other animals. For 
example, if you knew something about one bear would it tell you something about 
another bear or a bee?  People differ in what they think so don’t worry about your 
answers and you can stop at any time.  
 
If you decide that you don’t want to answer any of the questions, just let me know. 
There isn’t any penalty for not answering any question. Also, being part of this 
experiment doesn’t help or hurt your grades in any way. 
 
The first task takes about 10 minutes and the second task takes about 15 minutes.   
 
You are free to ask any questions at any time and you may stop participating if you 
would like.  Only other researchers that are working on this study will be shown your 
answers. 
 
As researchers we are very interested in learning about how children think, but we 
can’t find out answers to some of our questions about ‘thinking’ unless kids like you 
are willing to help us do this important work.  You can be very proud of the fact that 
today, you helped us get a little closer to understanding how kids think.  Today, you 
helped science ! 
 
This form was read to all participating students 
 
_____________________________________ 
Examiner Signature/Date 
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Appendix 3a 
 
Sample Script - Induction 
 
Task Script 
 
Scientist/ALL – DOG
EXAMINER: 
 
You are a careful scientist who works in a laboratory.  You know that some animals 
have magnesium inside them.  Animals with magnesium are in very important to your 
research.  Everyone is interested in animals with magnesium!.  You have a friend who 
has told you some valuable information.  He pulls out a picture and says, “All 
Dalmatians contain magnesium” (show participant picture of Dalmatian).  You 
need to find out what else has magnesium so you can make important scientific 
discoveries and become famous.  You don’t have a lot of time or money and not 
everything has magnesium, so what are you going to test? 
 
Remember, all Dalmatians contain magnesium.  (repeat for first 5 animals only) 
 
What about (fill in animal name).  Would you say a) I predict this has magnesium b) I 
predict this doesn’t have magnesium c) I want to wait before I predict. 
 
By now you trust your friend’s advice and you are happy when he gives you more 
information.  He pulls out a new picture (Place picture of Siamese on table) and 
says “All Siamese contain biotin”. You test some Siamese and are scientifically 
successful.  You want to test some more animals based on this information so you can 
become a famous scientist.  You are offered some things to test. 
 
Remember, all Siamese contain biotin. 
 
What about (fill in animal’s name).  Would say a) I predict this has magnesium b) I 
predict this doesn’t have magnesium c) I want to wait before I predict. 
 
 Proceed to Deduction Task – Scientist/DOG 
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Appendix 3b 
Sample Script -  Deduction 
 
Store Owner/ALL – DOG
Subordinate Level: Dalmatian
Script: 
Okay, now let’s pretend I’m your friend and after you have been buying and selling 
for a while you know that “All Dalmatians contain magnesium.”  You tell me that, 
but I’m a little puzzled so I say, ‘Show me what you mean.  I have a book of pictures 
and I’m going to ask you some questions.  For each of my questions you can tell me 
definitely yes, definitely no or there is no way to tell.  Can you help me?” 
 
Script: 
There are Dalmatians.  Do they have magnesium inside them? 
These are not Dalmatians.  Do they have magnesium inside them? 
These have magnesium inside them.  Are they Dalmatians? 
These do not have magnesium inside them.  Are they Dalmatians? 
 
Basic Level:  Dogs
Script: 
Wow!  I just realized that if it’s a dog, it has magnesium inside it!  I’m going to look 
at some other pictures and ask you some more questions.  For each of my questions 
you can tell me definitely yes, definitely no or there is no way to tell. 
 
Script: 
There are dogs.  Do they have magnesium inside them? 
These are not dogs.  Do they have magnesium inside them? 
These have magnesium inside them.  Are they dogs? 
These do not have magnesium inside them.  Are they dogs? 
 
Superordinate Level:  Animals
Script: 
Okay, I think I understand this information.  If they are animals, they have 
magnesium inside the.  Hhmmm…..I just have a few more questions.  Just remember, 
for each of my questions you can tell me definitely yes, definitely no or there is no 
way to tell. 
 
Script: 
There are animals.  Do they have magnesium inside them? 
These are not animals.  Do they have magnesium inside them? 
These have magnesium inside them.  Are they animals? 
These do not have magnesium inside them.  Are they animals? 
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